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MEMORANDUM
February 19, 1982
List 5, Sheet 1
No. 81-802-ATX
CITY OF LOCKHA

ROM THREE-JUDGE
COURT
from DCDC (Pratt,
June Green; Robinson, C.J.
[Cir. J.], dissenting)
C

v.

TATES,g
SUMMARY:

oL

Federal/Civil
Whether

Timely

the DC properly denied preclearance

of the Voting Rights Act to electoral changes resulting
adoption of a home rule charter, on the ground that
the effect of abridging the voting rights of
Mexican-Americans.
2.

FACTS and PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Texas state law defines

types of cities -- "general law cities," which have limited

-

2 -

authority to govern themselves, and "home rule" cities, which
have broad self-governing authority.

By satisfying certain state

requirements, a "general law city" may adopt a charter and bece".rne
a "home rule city."
Austin,

was

a

Until 1973, appt Lockhart, a Texas city near

"general

law"

city

governed

by

a

commission

consisting of a mayor and two commissioners elected at-large for
two-year terms.

Since 1917, Lockhart has used a "numbered post"

system, whereby candidates for commissionerships must specify
which of the two commission offices they are

seeking.

In 1970, Lockhart's population was 45% Anglo, 41% MexicanAmerican, and 14% black.

About 30% of the registered voters were

Mexican-American. The various ethnic groups had long engaged in
racial bloc voting.

In 1973, the City's voters adopted a home

rule

employed

charter

government.

which
The

charter

a

"council-manager"

provided

that

a

mayor

form
and

of
four

councilmembers would be elected at-large to numbered posts.

The

four councilmembers were to serve staggered terms, with two being
elected every other year.
In 1977, four Mexican-American voters, including appee Cano,
challenged the consti tut ionali ty of the new Lockhart electoral
system in WD Tex.

They charged that the new electoral system

effectively

any

electoral

barred

office

in

Mexican-Americans

Lockhart.

from

Lockhart's

ever

winning

Mexican-Americans

traditionally engaged in "single-shot voting," concentrating
their votes in favor of any Mexican-American candidate.
Mexican-American

had

ever

held

elective

all

Only one

office· in Lockhart,

however, and then only because the non-Mexican-American vote had

-

been

split among

voting"

to

four

succeed.

3 -

other candidates,
Appee

Cano

allowing

charged

that

"single-shot

the

home

rule

charter's use of numbered posts and staggered terms effectively
reduced the field of candidates for each elective post, thereby
blunting

the

effectiveness

of

Mexican-American

"single-shot

voting."
Our ing the trial,

it became clear that the City had never

sought Justice Department approval of its 1973 electoral changes,
as required by §5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42
second

suit

was

filed

and

the

DC

enjoined

u.s.c.
further

§1973c.

A

Lockhart

elections until the 1973 electoral changes were approved under
§5.

The City then submitted its 1973 changes to Justice; after

the Asst.
action,

AG objected

to the plan,

seeking a declaratory

the City brought

this §5

judgment that the 1973 electoral

changes had "neither the purpose nor the effect of abridging the
voting rights of Mexican-American citizens."

App. to J.S. 2a.

The City also claimed that the numbered-post provision of
the 1973 charter was not an electoral "change" reviewable under
§5

because

Lockhart

had

used

numbered

posts

before November,

1972, the relevant date for Voting Rights Act purposes. The City
cited in support of its argument Beer v. United States, 425 U.S.
130

(1975),

where

this

Court

held

by

a

5-3 margin

(Justice

Stevens, not participating) that the preclearance requirements of
§5

did

not

apply

to

two discriminatory at-large councilmanic

seats adopted by a 1954 city charter and then preserved in a
later reapportionment ordinance.
district court was convened.

Id., at 138-139.

A three-judge

- 4 -

DECISION BELOW:

3.

disputed issues:

The DC found

(1) whether the electoral modifications wrought

by the 1973 charter were
whether

those

discriminatory

"changes"

modifications

reviewable under §5.

had

reviewable under
been

adopted

§5 ~

with

(2)
a

and (3) whether those modifications had a

purpose~

discriminatory effect.

grounds.

that there were three

The DC first found that the changes were
The majority distinguished Beer on three

First, the DC noted, the discriminatory at-large seats

in Beer were not mentioned in the ordinance that adopted the
reapportionment plan, and the City's voters were not called upon
to consider them.
charter

had

In Lockhart, by contrast, the 1973 home rule

abolished

completely

the

commission

form

of

government and substituted in its place an entirely new form of
city government and electoral scheme approved by the voters.
Second, Texas law does not authorize a
adopt

numbered-post

provisions.

To

"general law city" to
permit

the

City's

discriminatory numbered-post provision to escape §5 preclearance
would reward the city for its past illegal activities.

Thus,

Lockhart's "numbered-post provision, illegitimate at inception,
must be treated for Section 5 purposes as if it had never existed
until it appeared legitimately pursuant to Texas law in the" home
rule charter.

App. to J.S. 13a.

Third, the new charter not only provided numbered posts, but
added two councilmen and staggered their terms, thus requiring
that elections be held annually rather than biennially.
assuming

the

validity

of

the

original

two

"Even

numbered-post

provisions, the provision for an additional two numbered posts in

- 5 -

conjunction

with

the

provision

for

sta9gered

terms

has

a

synergistic discriminatory effect." Id., at 14a. See also City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 130

(1980): S. Rep. No. 94-925,

94th

H.R.

Cong.

Cong.

1st Sess.

1st Sess.

27-28

19-20

(1975):

(1975)

Rep.No.

(recognizing

94-126,

94th

that election plans

combining numbered posts, staggered terms, and racial bloc voting
could have a discriminatory impact on minority voting rights).
Since

the City could

not win

a

declaratory

judgment

by

proving absence of discriminatory purpose

without also proving

absence

DC

of

bifurcate

"discriminatory

the case

purpose

inquiry.

whether

the

to avoid
The

changes

Mexican-Americans'

effect,"

DC

had

then

chose

to

the more difficult di scr imina tory

held
the

the

trial

ef feet

rights to vote.

solely
of

on

denying

the
or

question
abridging

By a 2-1 vote, the DC

held that both the numbered-post and the staggered-term features
of the 1973 charter effectively undercut the electoral power of
Lockhart's

Mexican-Americans

by

candidate field and highlighting
each

position.

Concluding

"retrogressive,"

the

reducing
the

that

DC dismissed

the

size

of

the

individual candidates for

the

1973

appt' s

changes

dec lara tory

were
judgment

action for failure to show absence of discriminatory effect.
Chief Judge Robinson dissented.
rule

charter

had

effected

three

Noting that the 1973 home

changes--

formal

adoption of

numbered posts, addition of two councilmember ships, and use of
staggered terms -- he argued that none of those changes had a
discriminatory

effect.

adoption of

numbered- post provision was not a

a

The dissent argued

first,

that

formal

"change"

in

- 6 In Perkins v. Matthews,

voting procedures for purposes of §5.
400 U.S. 379, 394
submission of

(1971), the Court had stated that §5 required

voting

procedures

for

preclearance only to the

extent that they may be different from the procedure "in fact in
force or effect on" the relevant statutory date.

Perkins showed

that it is irrelevant whether or not the preexisting procedure
was invalid under state law.
The dissent conceded that the addition of two new numberedpost

councilmanic

seats

and

"changes" for §5 purposes.
created a

the

use

of

staggered

terms were

But while agreeing that these changes

theoretical potential for vote dilution, Chief Judge

Robinson argued that neither would lead to the retrogression in
the
~

position

of

the

proscribed by §5.

electoral

power

of

Mexican-Americans

See Beer, supra, 425 U.S., at 141

(emphasis

added) .
The pivotal consideration here is that while minorities
cannot --because council seats are numbered -- resort
to single shot balloting in councilmanic elections, the
stark fact is that they never could, for the nonmayoral seats have always been numbered. And it seems
obvious that the charter provision for elections to the
new council seats in odd-numbered years -- and its
accompaniment, the staggering of terms -- tend no more
to highlight racial identities of candidates for those
seats than did the pre-charter practice of filling the
two original seats through elections in even-numbered
years. The election procedures for both pairs of seats
are identical, and no dimuni t ion in minor ty voting
power is discernible. App. 36a (emphasis added).
Thus,

the

dissent

argued

preclearance improperly.

that

the

majority

had

denied

Since the trial had been bifurcated,

Chief Judge Robinson urged that the proceedings be reopened so
that the parties might submit additional evidence on the question
of the City's discriminatory purpose.

- 7 4.

CONTENTIONS:
It

toto.

urges

changes was

not

Appt adopts

that
a

the

the dissent's arguments

numbered-post

"change"

reviewable

feature
under

of

the
It

§5.

in

1973

further

argues that while the addition of two councilmanic seats and the
use of staggered terms were reviewable "changes," neither had the
effect

of

diluting

Mexican-American

voting

power.

Like

the

dissent, appt charges that the DC's decision conflicts with both
Beer and Perkins v. Matthews, supra.
Appee

SG

agrees

with

appt

that

the

dissent

below

was

correct. The SG agrees with the majority that the 1973 electoral
changes were reviewable under §5; thus, the City could not obtain
declaratory
neither

a

relief without demonstrating
discriminatory purpose nor

See Allen v.
(1969) •

that

the changes had

a discriminatory effect.

State Board of Elect ions,

393 u.S.

544,

565-566

He further concedes that the DC had the discretion to

bifurcate the case into inquiries into discriminatory effect and
discriminatory purpose.
The SG asserts,
effects question and

however,

that the DC wrongly decided the

improperly failed

important purpose issue.

to address

the equally

Adopting the dissenting opinion's view

of discnminatory effect, the SG argues that the evidence below
supports the

dissenter's

view

that

there

had

been

no

actual

retrogression resulting from the adoption of the 1973 home rule
charter.
The

SG

is

reluctant

to

recommend

noting

probable

jurisdiction, however, since the DC has not yet made a ruling on
the question of discriminatory intent, and "much of the evidence

- 8 already before the court bears at least as much on the question
of intent" as on the issue of discriminatory effect. Thus, the SG
urges the Court to vacate the DC's judgment under 28 U.S.C. §2106
and remand the case so that the DC may receive evidence on the
issue of the City's discriminatory intent. 1

He notes that the

Court would then be free to review the entire case at a later
date.
Appee Cano argues that the DC majority opinion was correct
in

all

particulars,

summarily affirmed.

and

that

the

judgment

below

should

be

Appee also reargues the facts, arguing that

the electoral changes do in fact dilute Mexican-American voting
strength in Lockhart.
5.

DISCUSSION:

The dissent below appears correct.

There

seems little doubt that the new home rule charter did effect a
"cognizable" change in the form of the city government which appt
was obligated
since

the

incorporated

to submit for

previously

preclearance under §5, especially

illegal

numbered-post

into the new charter.

provision

The primary effect of

was
the

electoral changes, however, was that numbered-post elections for

1 while appt's jurisdictional statement urges the Court to
note probable jurisdiction and hear oral argument, appt has now
filed a supplemental memorandum joining the SG in requesting that
the DC's judgment be vacated and the case remanded for further
proceedings limited only to the question of discriminatory
intent.

- 9 two councilmanic seats would

be conducted yearly,

rather

than

every other year.

As the dissent argues, it is hard to see how

Mexican-Americans'

voting strength would become more diluted in

any given election simply because elections are being held twice
as often.

Under Beer, then, it does not appear that there could

be sufficient evidence of discriminatory effect.
6.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the reasons stated by the SG,

recommend that the judgment be vacated under 28

u.s.c.

I

§2106 and

that the case be remanded to the DC for further proceedings on
the issue of discriminatory purpose.
There are two responses and a supplemental memorandum.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
No. 81-802:
City of Lockhart v. United States, et al.
From:

October 19, 1982

Mark

~

Questions Presented

1. Whether the City of Lockhart's 1973 adoption of a horne
rule

charter,

incorporating

some

features

of

the

preexisting

electoral scheme, was subject to review under §5 of the Voting
Rights Act.
2. Whether adoption of that plan caused a retrogression of
the voting power of Mexican-American residents.

~~

2.

I. Background
A. Facts
The City of Lockhart is in Caldwell County, Texas, 30 miles
south of Austin.
Anglo,

In 1970 its population of 6,489 persons was 45%

41% Mexican-American, and 14% black; of 2,640 registered

voters,

23%

City Is

3,267

(559)

were

Mexican-American.

In

1977

30% of

the :;t>7~r
frt

registered voters were Mexican-American.

population is about 7,500

Current

Lnf!'~

~-a.-_

(no racial breakdown is provided).

-

Until 1973 Lockhart was a "general law" city, meaning that
it could exercise only powers specifically authorized by Texas
law.

Texas law provides for general law cities to be governed by

a mayor and two commissioners elected at-large every two years by
plurality vote.

Since 1917 Lockhart used a "numbered post" sys-

tern for electing commissioners.

Each candidate was required to

designate which of the two seats he sought.
authorization

for

Texas'

general

law

There is no specific

cities

to

use

numbered

posts.

No Mexican-American was elected to municipal office under
.! ... '2the general law system.
<:1-""T

/

In 1972 the City Commission appointed a 15-member Charter
Study Committee

(9 Anglos, 4 Mexican-Americans, and 2 blacks) to

study the possibility of converting to "home rule" status, under
which cities may exercise all powers not prohibited by state law.
The committee eventually was designated the Charter Commission.
I'-

\\

It unanimously proposed a home rule charter providing for

:=

-==-

-:

(1)

a

mayor and four council members, all elected at-large by plurality
vote;

(2)

election

of

council

members

to

numbered

posts;

(3)

staggered terms, whereby the mayor and two council members would

77

1

~

~
~~

be elected in even years, the other two members in odd years.

--

In 1973 Lockhart voters
referendum.

Elections were

1973 to 1978.

( 309-40)

adopted the charter in a

held pursuant

to

the charter

from

During this period the number of Mexican-American

registered voters, actual voters, and candidates increased significantly.

In 1978 a Mexican-American for

the first time

elected to the council.

for

Severe racial bloc voting always has prevailed.

In 1978,

example,

Mexican-

Americans.

660

out

of

1,993

votes

were

cast

by

The victorious Mexican-American councilman was elect-

ed over four Anglo candidates by a plurality vote of 655.
striking

closeness

between

his

tally

and

the

total

The

Mexican-

American vote -- a closeness that occurred in past elections as
well

demonstrates the bloc voting.
In 1977 four Mexican-Americans filed a suit challenging the

constitutionality

of

the method

for

electing

Cano v. Kirksey, No. 77-CA-133 (W.D. Tex. 1977).

council members.
During trial it

was discovered that the City never had sought §5 preclearance of
the home rule charter. 1

A second action was filed, and the DC

enjoined the City from holding elections until the 1973 changes
had
Mar.

been precleared.
2, 1979).

Cano v.

Chessar,

A-79-CA-032

(W.D.

Tex.

The City did not appeal the DC's decision that

the 197 3 changes were

subject to § 5 preclearance.

(Apparently

1 The 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act made Texas,
and thus the City of Lockhart, subject to §5 preclearance for all
electoral changes made after November 1, 1972.

4.

the original 1977 action remains
of this case.

unresol~ed

pending the outcome

See Brief for Appellants at 3 n.l.)

In May 1979 the City submitted the home rule charter to the
Attorney General for preclearance.
terposed an objection "insofar as
at-large method of

In September 1979 the AG in[the charter]

incorporates an

election, with numbered posts and staggered

terms."

B. Proceedings Below
In February 1980 the City sought a declaratory judgment in
the D.D.C. that its home rule charter did not violate §5.

Alfred

Cano, the named plaintiff in the previous two actions and an unsuccessful candidate for councilman in 1974, intervened as a defendant.

The three-judge DC bifurcated the trial, and heard evi-

dence only on

the question of discriminatory effect.

In July

1981 the court (2-1) dismissed the action on this basis, and thus
did not reach the issue of discriminatory purpose.

J.S. at 2a.

Judge Pratt and Judge June Green first held that the changes
were subject to §5.

Although numbered posts previously had been

used, that use was in a different electoral system and also was
in violation of Texas law.

On the merits the majority held that

the City had failed to meet its burden of disproving discriminatory effect.

Numbered posts and staggered terms diminish

the

leverage minority groups possess by virtue of "single-shot" voting.

They combine to form a "synergistic discriminatory effect."

J.S. at 14a.

--c:?.

I

Chief Judge Spottswood Robinson (CADC) dissented.

The con-

'1~

5.
tinued use of the existing numbered seats did not constitute a
change subject to §5, regardless whether the prior practice was
unlawful.

The two new numbered positions and the use of stag-

gered terms were subject to §5, but neither produced retrogression of Mexican-American voting power.

The voters had the same

electoral choices as before, only now every year rather than every other year.
ings

for

Judge Robinson would have reopened the proceed-

consideration

of

discriminatory

purpose,

though

he

doubted that such purpose could be proven here.
This Court noted probable jurisdiction.

The United States

defended the suit below, but now has switched its position.

The

SG agrees with the DC majority that the changes were subject to
§5 preclearance, but now disagrees that the changes had a retrogressive effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Americans.
pellee Cano
_.....

Ap-

defending the judgment below.

II. Discussion
A. Applicability of §5
The issue here is narrow.
tion of

two council

seats and

changes subject to §5.

Lockhart concedes that the addithe

use of staggered terms are

It contends,

however,

that §5 does not

apply to (1) continuation of the two old seats, and (2) continued
use of numbered places generally.

The SG contends that the en-

tire home rule charter is subject to §5 review.
tion,

therefore,

The basic ques-

is whether features of an electoral plan that

existed in the preceding system are subject to preclearance.
I

agree with

the

SG.

It would

impede the purpose of § 5

6.
preclearance -- whatever one thinks of that purpose, see Georgia
v. United States, 411
ing)

u.s.

(Powell, J., dissent-

526, 545 (1973)

-- to require the AG to restrict his consideration only to

those electoral changes that previously did not exist.

Individ-

ual procedures or practices that in the abstract seem nondiscriminatory may have a discriminatory impact when combined with preFor example,

existing electoral features.
council seats,
fects

creation of two new

clearly a change subject to §5, necessarily af-

the political

importance of

the

two old

seats.

And

it

would be artificial for the AG to rule on the possible discriminatory impact of adding new seats without considering that they
are numbered posts.

It is not true, as the City's argument im-

plies, that prior use of numbered places insulates from §5 review
any expanded or altered use of numbered places.
tled

to consider

The AG is enti-

the entire plan before making a

preclearance

decision.
The
(1976).

City
There

relies
the

on

Beer

DC had

v.

United

rejected

a

States,

voting

425

plan

u.s.

because

130
it

failed to eliminate two at-large council seats that had existed
since 1954.

The Court reversed, observing that the plan did not

refer to the existing council seats and the city ordinance implementing the plan had not purported to alter them.
hand is distinguishable.

The case at

Lockhart's 1973 home rule charter spec-

ified that the two existing commission seats would become seats
in an

expanded counci 1.

There

is

no doubt

that

Lockhart has

adopted a new system of elected government.
Permitting the AG to review both retained and new features

7.
of an electoral plan does not empower him .to object solely on the
basis of the preexisting practices.

Beer holds that a city may

adopt a new plan retaining old features, even allegedly discrirninatory features,
retrogressive.

so long as the net effect on minorities is not
See p.

8

infra.

Thus

the practical effect of

subjecting the entire plan to review is of limited significance.
The City's
means of

basic point is

forcing rnunicipali ties

and procedures.
stantive

that the AG

should not

use §5 as a

to drop longstanding practices

This point is correct, but it goes to the sub-

standard of

§5

rather

than to the threshold question

whether preclearance is required.
The Court need not rule on the SG's argument that §5 applies
because the horne rule charter rearranged and enlarged local governrnental

powers.

I

have

little

difficulty with

the argument

that fundamental changes in the governmental system, as occurred
here, may be reviewed under §5.

But I do doubt whether realloca-

tion of governmental powers, whether major or minor, should permit the AG to object to an unaltered electoral scheme.
a conflict on this issue.

Compare Horry County v. United States,

449 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1978)
Hamilton,

473 F.

Supp.

There is

641

(three-judge court), with Woods v.

(D.S.C.

1979)

(three-judge court) • 2

Here the AG did not object to the horne rule provisions.

Since

this charter did change electoral practices, there is no need to

-----------~--------~'--------------------..J
2 This conflict is presented in McCain v. Lybrand, No. 82282 (appeal pending) , in which the views of the SG have been
requested.

J

~

8.
decide whether the change to home rule sufficed to permit the AG
to review the electoral structure.

B. Discriminatory Effect on Minority Voting Rights
1. The Retrogression Standard:

Beer v. United States

The DC majority, Judge Robinson, and the SG agree -- and the
City apparently does not dispute -- that use of numbered posts
and staggered terms can disadvantage electoral minorities.

The

SG explains:
Numbered posts virtually eliminate the possibility of single-shot voting, because only the
candidate garnering the highest number of
votes for each post can triumph.
Similarly,
the use of staggered terms of office limits
the number of positions at stake in each election and requires that minority candidates
finish higher in the field to win election.
Staggered terms may also decrease voter turnout, since . voter interest may suffer if fewer
places are at stake.
(Brief for United States
at 21.)

j rJ~t..t>f-~
_, . ~~
~h./~

The issue here, however, is not whether these practices may
be discriminatory,

but whether

home

resulted

rule

charter

their

in a

incorporation in the 1973

diminution of minority voting

rights. V Beer v. United States held that "the purQ..ose of § 5 has : "
always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be
made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial
minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise."
did not prohibit a

425

u.s.

at 141.

In Beer this meant that §5

voting change that

diminished,

but did not

eliminate, the discriminatory effect of the preexisting electoral
system.

9.
2. The Basis for Determining Retrograssion:
Perkins v. Matthews
Normally there would be no question that the retrogression
determination is based on a comparison of the proposed plan with
the existing system.

But the DC majority found that Lockhart's

previous use of numbered posts was illegal under Texas law, and
therefore "must be treated for Section 5 purposes as if it had
never

existed until

it appeared legitimately pursuant to Texas

law in the 1975 Lockhart City Charter."

J. S. at 13a. 3

Along

with Judge Robinson, I disagree.
First, the DC's interpretation of Texas law it not necessar- ~ily correct.

No specific case requires this interpretation.

DC's reading was plausible but strict:

~k~

t-(

Ttfe

since a general law city

-,;q~

can exercise only powers conferred by law, and since the statute ~
requiring the commissioner elections did not specify that commis- ~
sioner posts could be numbered,
have been

illegal.

Certainly a

the use of numbered posts must
different result

is possible.

Lockhart used the system since 1917, and this use never was

chal ~
~

lenged.

'

More important, the DC disregarded Perkins v. Matthews, 400 .

u.s.

379

{1971).

Quite to the contrary of the DC's view that a

city's illegal electoral system should be treated "as if it had

3 The DC relied on the alleged illegality of the pre-1973
use of numbered posts as an alternate ground for finding that the
1973 electoral changes were subject to review under §5. As the
SG argues, however, this Perkins issue is critical to the
retrogression inquiry. See Brief for United States at 22-24 &
n.l3.

;'

1117

never existed," Perkins held:

"In our view, Section 5's

-

ence to the procedure 'in force or effect on November 1, 1964,
must be taken to mean the procedure that would have been followe
if the election had been held on that date."
This construction is unambiguous.
"-----

.....

...........__,

Id. at 394.

The DC refused to apply

it solely because whereas in Perkins the construction "extended
§5 protection to the fullest extent, in accordance with the policy underlying the Voting Rights Act," its application here "would
permit plaintiff's discriminatory numbered-post provision to escape §5 preclearance [and] would reward plaintiff for its illegal
activities

in the past."

J.S. at 13a-14a.

Appellee similarly

argues against an "inflexible reading" and "wooden application"
of Perkins.

Brief for Appellee at 5, 33.

The Court thus is asked to reject a logical and consistent
principle of statutory construction in favor of the principle of
construing the statute in whatever manner is most favorable
the

plaintiffs

in

a

particular

a

result-oriented

method of statutory construction is unacceptable.

Perkins should

be applied.

3. Application of Beer

case.

Such

to

~~ \

The D.D.C. majority essentially ignored Beer.

The opinion ~

of Judge Pratt and Judge Green emphasized the "synergistic discriminatory effect" produced by use of numbered posts and staggered terms, J.S. at 14a, then abruptly concluded:

"Unlike Beer,

the apportionment plan before us is not ameliorative but is retrogressive because the ability of Mexican-Americans to participate in the political process and to elect their choices to of-

11.
fice is diminished by the numbered-post
tern."

J

.s.

at 16a.

~nd

staggered-terms sys-

This conclusory assertion was not supported }

by a single argument as to how Lockhart's minority voters were
worse off than before 1973.
The DC majority's failure to support its conclusion is understandable.

As

Judge

Robinson's

dissent made clear,

Beer's

reasoning leads inexorably to a finding of no retrogression.

The

following discussion sets forth Judge Robinson's position, which
I find convincing, and then evaluates appellee's attempt to explain how retrogression has occurred.
a. Numbered Posts

rCJ.~~~~
~~
du.L:u...f
_..--r:;-., __

Judge Robinson stated:

~

"It

__,~

. .....,~

is abundantly clear

that

~

CI-

the ~

addition of the two numbered council seats to be filled in odd- ~
numbered years in no way deteriorates the strength of the
ity vote
City's

in Lockhart."

voters elected

candidates

running

for

J.S. at 32a.
two persons
numbered

mino~

Under the old system the

in even-numbered years

posts.

Under

the charter

from
the

voters "would go to the polls twice as frequently to ballot on
council membership, but the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities, whether or not enhanced, would not be diminished one whit.
Every year,

as a councilmanic election in Lockhart approaches,

minorities would occupy the same relative position they formerly
did in every alternate year --perhaps no stronger, but certainly
no weaker. "
increasing

J. S.

at 3 3a.

In fact,

Judge Robinson noted,

the number of seats on the governing

body,

"by

the new

charter may offer minorities a more effective role in the selection of

its membership

than

they had

before."

Id.

The 1978

12.
election of

the first Mexican-American to the council supports
~

this argument.
As Judge Robinson noted, no one can argue that an

~

increase ~

in size of the council alone would dilute minority voting power. ~
J.S. at 24a n.24.

cre~e

The uncontradicted testimony was that

generally is beneficial to minorities.

~
~i;1~

Perhaps~

the DC was correct in determining that the increase from three ~4
elected positions to five positions was too small to provide a
substantial benefit, see J.S. at 8a, but it hardly follows that a
small increase can be harmful to the minority vote.
Thus to demonstrate retrogression appellee must explain why
Mexican-Americans are better off electing two councilmen to numbered posts than four councilmen to numbered posts.
as this sounds on its very face,
try.

He contends

that

the

Implausible

appellee gives the argument a

new posts

"give Anglo aspirants

a

larger number of separate occasions to win election without running against each other and dividing the dominant Anglo vote so
deeply that a Mexican American might win."

4

Brief for Appellee

at 46.
The argument is meritless as both a factual and a logical

4Appellee suggests that retrogression has occurred because
the 1973 adoption of the charter in accordance with state law
deprived Mexican-Americans of an opportunity to enhance their
voting strength by bringing a successful state-law challenge to
the pre-1973 use of numbered posts. See Brief for Appellee at
31. This unique argument seems merit~s. I would note, though,
that this "opportunity" was neglected for the entire 56-year
period during which numbered posts were used in Lockhart
elections.

13.
matter.

First, the record shows that in . 1978 there were twelve

non-Mexican-American candidates for
at stake

the three council positions

(the third seat was at stake because an incumbent had

resigned) .

In that election four Anglo candidates ran for place

#1 against the ultimately victorious Mexican-American candidate.
More generally,

the average number of Anglo candidates per year

from 1973-1978 was greater than the average number of Anglo candidates per year in elections held prior to 1973.

J.A. at 62a,

76a.
These facts bear out what common sense suggests.
of candidates for municipal office is not fixed.

The number

Rather, in ac-

cordance with what one might call a Murphy's law of elections,
the number of candidates expands to fill the number of offices
available.

The increase in council spots from two to four has

not reduced the frequency with which whites challenge one another
for council spots.
Appellee's argument also fails as a matter of logic.

If any

increase in numbered positions hurts Mexican-Americans by permitting whites to run against diminished white opposition -- which,
again,

in fact has not occurred -- then any increase above two

posts would
true:

be

retrogressive.

And the corollary also must be

if numbered posts are used, one post would be optimal be-

cause it maximizes the inter-Anglo competition.
I hardly think Mexican-Americans truly would find this result optimal.

For the existence of only one position also maxi-

mizes the inter-Mexican-American competition, and thus may divide
the Mexican-American vote.

Moreover, given the premise of Anglo

·.

14.
dominance and severe racial bloc voting, it seems doubtful that a
Mexican-American ever would win.

Had Lockhart in 1973 reduced

its number of council seats from two to one I have no doubt that
a heated §5 challenge would have been raised under the general
theory that a reduction in seats impairs the effectiveness of the
minority franchise.
It seems clear,
There

is no basis

then,

that appellee's argument must fail.

for holding that Lockhart's Mexican-American

voters are worse off electing four rather than two councilmen to
numbered posts.

Indeed,

if forced to a choice appellee 1 i kely

would not hesitate to choose the 1973 electoral scheme over the
earlier scheme.

Cf. Brief for Appellant at 26 n.21 {citing let-

ter from appellee to Justice Department stating that "we would
rather

suffer

the

consequences

of

the

current

discriminatory

election structure [i.e., the 1973 structure] rather than permanently disenfranchise the minority community through a city commission form of government [i.e., the pre-1973 government].").
b. Staggered Terms

Jt..er_ ~ ~
~e%£§F
~-

Judge Robinson concluded" that
here did not cause retrogression.

t e rms ~
~6-e'The only difference from the
the

use of

staggered

old system is that now elections will occur annually

rather~ ·

biennially.

no

"[The

highlight

racial

than did

the

seats

through

staggering

identities of

of

terms]

will

candidates

for

pre-charter practice of filling
elections

in

even-numbered

tend

more ~

[the new]

seats

the two original

years.

The election

procedures for both pairs of seats are identical, and no diminution in minority voting power is discernible."

J.S. at 36a.

15.
Appellee raises a counterargument to .t his finding of no retrogression:

"By virtue of the increased frequency of elections,

staggered terms tend to reduce voter turn-out.

[And]

low

voter turnout has its most severe consequences among minorities,
particularly Mexican Americans.

. Thus, more frequent elec-

tions undermine the high level of minority voter participation
which is necessary for minority candidates to have any chance of
success."
This

Brief for Appellee at 47.
argument

conflicts

against staggered terms.
gered terms,

with

appellee's

argument

The problem, he alleges, is that stag-

like numbered posts, have a

that nullifies

basic

single-shot voting.

Brief

"spotlighting" effect
for

Appellee at

46.

And earlier he argues that such spotlighting or "targetting" has
led to high voter turnout in Lockhart whenever a strong MexicanAmerican candidate has run.

Id. at 44 & n.39.

If this is a cen-

tral problem with staggered terms, one may wonder at the logic of
arguing

simultaneously

that staggered

terms

are

discriminatory

because they cause low voter turnout.
The record fails
voter

turnout.

to support appellee's argument about low

To demonstrate apathetic Mexican-American voter

interest resulting from the annual elections, appellee cites only
the 1975 election, in which a mere 176 voters turned out, only 10
of whom were Spanish-surnamed.

This example is meaningless.

In

1975 two candidates, neither one Mexican-American, ran for council, each unopposed for the
62a,

76a.

The

staggered terms.

numbereq ~ place

low turnout had nothing

he sought.

to do with

the

J.A. at
use of

16.
The data as a whole reveal that Mexican-American turnout has

_____

been fairly high.
__:::.,.-...

Mexican-Americans constituted 23% of

tered voters in 1970, 30% in 1977.

regis-

Yet Mexican-Americans' share

of the votes cast increased from 13% of the vote in 1970 to 34%
in 1976,

22%

in 1977, and 33% in 1978.

Despite the staggered

terms, then, Mexican-Americans turned out in each recent election
in representative numbers.
There is some correlation between the number of places at
issue

and

the

Mexican-American

turnout.

Three counci 1

plus the mayor's office were at stake in 1978
Mexican-American),
American)

whereas

in

1977

(22%

of

places

(33% of vote was

vote

only two council positions were at issue.

was

Mexican-

But at most

this correlation shows that staggered terms may have some effect
on minority

turnout.

It does not show that the imposition of

staggered terms has effected an actual reduction in the voting
strength of Lockhart's Mexican-American voters.

On this crucial

issue I think the record strongly suggests that these voters are
better off, not worse off, voting for two council positions every
year

than two counci 1 positions every two years.

There is no

evidence suggesting, and no logical basis for believing, that had
the City retained its system of two seats elected every two years
Mexican-Americans would have voted in substantially larger numbers and elected more Mexican-American councilmen.
4. Other Arguments for Affirmance
Appellee

raises

two

additional

arguments

for

affirmance.

First, he contends that the Court should not adopt "a purely mechanical

application of Beer."

Brief

for

Appellee at

48.

He

17.
suggests that Beer may no longer be valid given the legislative
history of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, and argues:

"This Court should apply that more flexible standard con-

templated by the 1982 amendment."
natively,
correct
Id.

Id. at 52.

Second, and alter-

the Court "need not and should not now re-examine the

application of

Beer

in

light of

the 1982 amendments."

Instead, the Court should recognize that the DC's finding of

retrogression was a factual finding that cannot be deemed clearly
erroneous.
I do not see any point in debating the effect of the 1982
(It appears,

amendments, which are not at issue here.
that the Court eventually may have to decide

though,

on the basis of a

vague passage in a Senate Report -- whether the 1982 extension of
§5 overrules Beer.}
ing

of

The Court should not defer to the DC's find-

retrogression.

The

reaching its conclusion.

DC

majority

made

legal

errors

in

Moreover, the DC opinion made no argu-

ment how minority voting strength had been diminished by the home
rule charter.

Judge Robinson's unassailable analysis proves that

the DC majority's finding was clearly erroneous.

C. The DC's Relief
Appellant
entire

home

judgment.
to

require

argues

rule

that

plan

when

the

DC

erroneously

refusing

to

This is a puzzling argument.
this

result.

No party seeks

grant

invalidated

the

the declaratory

The DC did not purport
this result.

The net

effect of refusing to grant the declaratory judgment was that the
AG's objection remained -- and the AG objected only to the use of

18.
staggered terms and numbered posts.
This question need not be addressed if the Court reverses
and remands.

If the Court affirms,

it simply should note that

the DC's holding should not be read to require Lockhart to revert
to general law status.
eration,

There is no legal issue worthy of consid-

and the City probably just wants a statement ensuring

that its home rule status is not jeopardized.

III. Conclusion
The DC's decision should be reversed and remanded:
1. The entire electoral system adopted in 1973 was subject
to review under §5.
2. The key question is whether Lockhart's Mexican-American
voters have suffered a retrogression of voting power under Beer
v. United States.
3.

The

electoral

___

...____.....
scheme existing prior to the home rule

charter -- including the perhaps unlawful use of numbered posts -

is the proper basis for determining retrogression.

Perkins v.

Matthews.
4.

Under Beer minority voters in Lockhart did not suffer

retrogression of voting power by virtue of the 1973 charter.
a.

The addition

of

two more

enhanced minority voting power,
it.

The increase to four

numbered

posts

arguably

and certainly did not diminish

numbered posts has not enabled Anglo

candidates to avoid competition from other Anglos.
b. Despite the use of staggered terms Mexican-Americans
have voted in increasing and representative numbers.

There is no

19.
basis for believing that they would have voted in greater numbers
had the City retained its system of two seats elected every two
years.
5. Whether the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act affect the validity of Beer is not at issue in this case.
6. The DC's finding of retrogression was clearly erroneous.
7.

The case

criminatory

should

purpose,

could be found here.

be

though

remanded
almost

for consideration of discertainly

no

such

purpose
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue in this case is the application of §5
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended,
§1973c,

to

the

councilmanic

election

plan

5

42 U.S.C.

adopted

by

appellant City of Lockhart in 1973.

10

I

.·

The City of Lockhart is a community of just under
8,000 people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south
of Austin.

According to the most recent census figures,

almost 47% of the City's population are Mexican-American.
As

of

1977,

however,

fewer

than

30%

of

the

City's

15

registered voters were Mexican-American.
Before 1973,

Lockhart was a "general law" city.

Under Texas law, general law cities have only those powers
that the State specifically permits them to possess.
authorized

by

State

law,

commission consisting of

a

Lockhart
mayor and

was

governed

by

As
a

two commissioners,

20
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These offices were

all serving the same two-year terms.
filled

in April of even-numbered years

elections
system,

using

the

a

two

"numbered

post"

commissioner

through at-large

system.

posts

were

Under

this

designated

by

2

number, and each candidate for commissioner specified the
post for which he or she sought election.
was

effectively

a

separate

election

Thus each race
for

a

separate

office. 1
In

1973,

Lockhart

became a "home rule" city.

adopted

a

new

charter,

and

In contrast to a general law

city, a home rule city has authority to do whatever is not
;

specifically

prohibited

by

the

considerable

discretion

to

define

government,
elections.

and

to

establish

State.

the

the

This

includes

form

of

city

for

city

procedures

As part of its new charter, Lockhart chose to

be governed by a city council consisting of a mayor and
four

councilmen

serving

3

staggered

two-year

terms.

The

mayor and two of the councilmen are elected in April of

1 This numbered post system may be contrasted with a
system in which all of the candidates for the two
commissioner posts run in a single election, and the two
receiving the greatest number of votes are elected.

"
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page 3.

even-numbered years through at-large elections using the

40
'·

numbered

post

system.

The

other

two

councilmen

are
.,

,,'

similarly elected in odd-numbered years.

''

Under
amended,

§5

of

the Voting Rights Act of 1965,

as

42 u.s.c. §1973c, 2 covered jurisdictions may not

2section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
[W]henever a State or political subdivision
[such as Lockhart]
shall enact or seek to
administer
any
voting
qualification
or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure with respect to voting different
from that in force or effect on November 1,
1972, such State or subdivision may institute an
action in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia for a declaratory
judgment that such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure does not have
the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention of
the guarantees set forth in section 4(f) (2)
[§1973b(f) (2)
(prohibiting
discrimination
against members of language minority groups)] ,
and unless and until the court enters such
judgment no person shall be denied the right to
vote
for
failure
to
comply
with
such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice,
or
procedure:
Provided,
That
such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice,
or procedure may be enforced without such
proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite,
standard,
practice,
or
procedure
has
been
submitted by the chief legal officer or other
appropritate
official
of
such
State
or
subdivision to the Attorney General and the
Attorney General has not interposed an objection
within sixty days after such submission
Neither
an
affirmative
indication
by
the
Attorney General that no objection will be made,
nor the Attorney General's failure to object,
nor a declaratory judgment entered under this
section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin
enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite,
standard,
practice,
or procedure.
Any
action under this section shall be heard and
determined by a court · of three judges in
accordance with the provisions of [28 U.S.C.
§2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme
Court.

!

l.

~. ~
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enforce

certain

changes

in

their

election

laws without

45

r_.i)
obtaining "preclearance" in one of two ways:
satisfy
States

§5

with

a

declaratory

District Court

for

judgment

{_/ ) f hey may
in

the

United

the District of Columbia that

the changes do not have the purpose and will not have the
effect

of

account

denying

of

race,

or

abridging

color,

r ey

or

the

right

membership

to

in

a

vote

on

50

language

iJll' {_:i<)
minority group) ,.. ~
Attorney
days,

If

General.

§5 1 s

he

may submit the changes to the
fails

to object

requirements are satisfied.

within

sixty

See, e.g., Allen

v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 548-550 (1969).
The

.

Act 1 s

coverage

W'ZI4has extended

to

the

State of

55

Texas

L-1-V

si:1-re e

197 5,

covering changes

in election procedure

those

in effect on November 1,

1972.

See

40 Fed.

from
Reg.

43746 (1975).
In

1977,

four

Mexican-Americans,

including

60

appellee Alfred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of
Lockhart 1 s

elect ion

procedures

under

the

19 7 3

charter.

Cano v. Kirksey, No. A-77-CA-133 (W.D. Tex. dismissed Oct.
8, 1982), appeal pending sub nom. Cano v. Chessar, No. 821616

(CAS

filed

Nov.

8,

1982).

In

the course of

this

65
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suit,

the plaintiffs discovered

obtained approval under §5 for

to

enjoin

procedures
States

the

City

pending

from

the

the changes

District Court

for

instituted in

-

a second suit was brought

using

required

~

the

Gh«n~Q~

~election

The

approval.

United

70

the Western District of Texas

granted injunctive relief. 3
0032

that Lockhart had never

F~llewil"t'9 -t h+s-d :t"!3-ce-v~

1973.

page 5.

Cano v. Chessar, No. A-79-CA-

(W.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 1979).
~

Once future elections had bQao enjoined pending
1\

§5

approval,

'?At eer-ney

Lockhart

Ce-ne-~.

sought

The

preclearance

Attorney

.

~£om

General,

th e-p--

75

however,

interposed an objection to the election procedures under
the 1973 charter to the extent that they incorporate atlarge elections, ' the numbered post system, and staggered
terms

for

councilmen.

Lockhart

then

filed

~

the

present

3 rn granting the injunction, the
District Court
lacked jurisdiction to pass on the discriminatory purpose
or effect of the changes.
All it could do was determine
(1) whether a change was covered by §5, (2) if the change
was covered, whether §5's approval requirements were
satisfied, and (3) if the requirements were not satisfied,
what remedy was appropriate.
United States v. Board of
Supervisors of Warren County,
429 U.S.
642, 645-647
(1977): Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 383-386 (1971):
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 555 n.l9
(1969).
Lockhart did not appeal the District Court's
finding that the 1973 charter imposed changes that are
covered by §5.

80
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page 6.

suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, seeking a declaratory judgment that the new
procedures

have

neither

the

purpose

nor

the

effect

of

denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race,
color, or membership in a language minority group.
intervened as a defendant.

As required by §5,

a

Cano

85

three-

judge court was convened to decide the case.

~

The District Court,
prove both the

a

oi

~discriminatory

discriminatory

~only

purpose,
the

first

effect and i::he laek

bifurcated
issue,

the City must

it

the

held,

dissent of Chief Judge Spottswood Robinson of

trial.
over

90

the

the Unites

/

tfis- DistrieG

Circuit,
effect

that

of

Lockhart's

discriminating

election
against

of

procedures

Columbj

have

a

the

protected minorities. 4

The Court first decided that the entire election plan was
subject to §5's requirements.
current

system

to

u~e

~
one

It then compared Lockhart's

used

before

the 197 3 charter

1\

4 rn

e;-

view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it
was unnecessary for the District Court to reach the issue
of discriminatory purpose.

95
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with one except ion:

the Court

refused

City's prior use of numbered posts.
the

ground

that

the

use

of

page 7.

to

recognize

the

This was justified on

numbered

posts

was

100

not

explicitly authorized by Texas law, and thus was illegal
for a general law city.
posts

and

impact,

staggered

The Court concluded that numbered
terms

particularly

in

each

view

had

of

the

a

discriminatory

history

of

racial

105

block voting in Lockhart.
Chief Judge Robinson, in dissent, agreed with the
majority that Lockhart's city council election procedures
were

subject

numbered

to

posts

§5
and

preclearance,
staggered

and

terms

that

tended

the
to

use

curb

ability of minorities to elect minority candidates.

of
the

110

But

relying on Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), he
concluded
voting
whether

that

there

no

retrogression

./.L

~ ~ccordingly If

strength.
there

was

had

been

a

would

have

discriminatory

in

minority

cons ide red
purpose

in

instituting the electoral changes.
The
contending

City

that

scope of §5,

appealed

the

and

the

judgment

to

this Court,

the District Court misconstrued

that,

in any event,

the

there has been no

115
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retrogression

in

States,

defended

which

minority

voting

the

'l'he

strength.

suit

below,

United

120

now agrees with

Lockhart that the changes had no retrogressive effect on
the

voting

continues

rights
to

of

defend

Mexican-Americans.
the

District

Cano,

Court's

u.s.

noted probable jurisdiction.

however,

judgment.
(1982) •

We

We now

125

vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

II

1\

/i~~~e~olve

is the scope of

§5's coverage in the circumstances of this case.
concedes

that

the

addition

of

two

seats

to

130

Lockhart

the

city's

governing body and the introduction of staggered terms are

changes subject to

§

5 pr eel ear

§ 5 does not apply to
seats

and

CClJlCl\,H~Q.

the

continued

.

~
-t.fiat.

the

the

"

entire

ad

l>ttt

~ t con tends that

"continuation" of

the two old

use

places.

of

system

numbered
introduced

in

the

13 ~

We
1973

charter is subject to preclearance.
This

Court ~ consistentl~ held that §5 covers

"any state enactment which alter[s] the election law of a

14
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covered State in even a minor way."

7

of Elections, 393 U.S., at 566.
how small,

[are]

subjec[t]

to §5 scrutiny."

6;~ admitte~ been

the

addi tiona!

terms.

and

Allen v. State Board

"[A]ll changes, no matter

Here

seats

page 9.

the

Id., at 568.

a change with respect to
introduction of

staggered

145

But there & a ;) alsoA been a change with respect to

the "continuation" of the two old seats.

By introducing a

new system of government, Lockhart has changed the nature
of the seats at issue.

Councilmanic posts one and two are

not identical to the old commission posts one and two.

By

150

.a..f~f-~J
the city __ __ ~

changing the composition of its governing body,

"

has changed the political significance of the "continuing"
seats.

To

give

but

one

e-~OtlS

example,

they

now

constitute only 40% of the new council, rather than 67% of
the

~

commission.

FJJrtherma,re,

it

is

impossible

to view

155

these seats in isolation, for they are an integral part of
the

council.

The

possible

discriminatory

purpose

or

ef feet of the new seats, w" i ~ a-re admittedly subject to
§5,

cannot

be

determined

in

isolation

from

the

"preexisting" elements of the council.
Lockhart nevertheless argues that there have not

160
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I-

(It

ctude

two

1't1R-~

{1me~

lbf -lq6)
(tftt '$

(ke

for

changes,

the

same as the old.

page 10.

new

elements

are

In making this argument,

es the distinction between §5 coverage and
lew under §5.
t),rj u me t\13.

artentfl>n,

A~our

ubject to §5 scrutiny.

perhup>

be beNe> oFF tF
Foot 11 () fe

165

discussion

1r, this does not preclude a finding that
f

~

permissible

under

Even

§5.

innocuous

iD

hes r ta}'\t
(he

Here we hold only that the

focif1'16 fe>

ainly have
.ire

§5

no

di scr imina tory

preclearance.

The

purpose or

fact

that

a

170

imately is entitled to preclearance does
not excuse it from the obligation to submit its changes ~ "
for review.
Lockhart also relies on our decision in Beer v.
United States,
readily

425 U.S.

130

distinguishable

on

considered

the

and

districts.
through

a

five

e£

wfi-em

point.
of

the

In
New

Beer,

we

Orleans

two of whom were elected at-

were

elected

from

councilmanic

New Orleans had reapportioned these districts
city

17~

The New Orleans City Council was

composed of seven members,
large

this

reapportionment

councilmanic districts.

but that decision is

(1976),

ordinance.

"The

ordinance

•..

made

no

18
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"actual"

been

changes,

for

the

essentially the same as the old.

new

elements

are

In making this argument,

the City confuses the distinction between §5 coverage and
substantive review under §5.

Here we hold only that the

A~our

new system is subject to §5 scrutiny.

165

discussion

below makes clear, this does not preclude a finding that
the

changes

changes
effect

are

that
may

permissible

plainly have
require

§5

under

no

§5.

Even

innocuous

discriminatory purpose or

preclearance.

The

fact

that

a

170

jurisdiction ultimately is entitled to preclearance does
not excuse it from the obligation to submit its changes
for review.
Lockhart also relies on our decision in Beer v.
United States, 425 U.S. 130

(1976), but that decision is

readily

this

distinguishable

considered

the

on

reapportionment

councilmanic districts.

point.
of

the

In
New

Beer,

175

we

Orleans

The New Orleans City Council was

composed of seven members, two of whom were elected atlarge

and

districts.
through

a

five

e£

wfl-em

were

elected

from

councilmanic

New Orleans had reapportioned these districts
city

ordinance.

"The

ordinance

made

no

180
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refe renee
since

to

those

charter,

the
seats

at-large
had

page 11.

councilmanic

been established

an ordinance could

not have

seats.
•. .

Indeed,

by the

altered

city

them;

any

185

change in the charter would have required approval by the
city's

voters."

ordinance did
other way.

Id.,

at

not affect

Furthermore,

138-139.

the

the at-large councilmen in any

It did not change their titles.

It did not

increase or decrease the size of the city council, which
would have altered the weight of their council votes.

190

It

did not change the powers of the City Council, which would
have altered their political significance.

In short, the

ordinance affected only the district councilmen.

It was

only in these circumstances that" [t]he at-large seats ••.
were not subject to review ... under §5."

195

Id., at 139.

III
Having

decided

that

Lockhart's

entire

councilmanic election plan is subject to §5 scrutiny, we
now consider whether the changes implemented by that plan
that have not been precleared by the Attorney General have
d'k.-

the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote

~

,?'A

200
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page 12.

~Df~.l/'y~,

A ~rtt

-or

Y 1iCQ 1

. . . _ cola L ~~ -4'1La~e

m~~

205

A

Our
comparison.
what

the

posts.
Texas

law

numbered
not

system

did

would

entitled

not

have

been

without

numbered

210

authorize

the

use

of

~

to

use

Matthews,

requirement

illegality.

specifically

""\ Lockhart, as a general law city, was

that recognition of
legal

appropriate

to

justified this comparison on the ground that

po3

Perkins v.

is

The District Court compared the new system to

old

It

step

first

them.
400

U.S.

The

distinguishing

court,

379,

394

(1971),

reasoned

215

the actual practice rather than the

would

reward

the

City

for

its

past

It preferred instead to draw its comparison

in a way that would maximize the reach of §5.
Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 5

4

~~ ~ t:A~<e.l~

5 It may be true that T
law d~e~ not specifically
authorize the use of numb
posts,.) J3-yt se1e are awaF-e of
specific authorization
a system without numbered
sts.
There does not appear to be any Texas case-law on
the subject.
In any event, Lockhart used its numbered
post system for over fifty years w?
'tho: t challenge, thtl~
suggesting seme presumption of regular'ty under state law.

~

22C

4.-.t

~

~
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but that is essentially irrelevant.
is

between

the

new

system

and

The proper comparison

the

system

actually

in

effect on November 1, 1972, 6 regardless of what state law
might have required.
Matthews,

There

supra.

election for
requiring

This was established in Perkins v.
a

city

aldermen by wards,

at-large

elections.

conducted

the

relevant

225

despite a state statute
As

the

Perkins

Court

explained:

230

"In our view, § 5 's reference to the procedure
'in force or effect on November 1, 19[72] ,' must
be taken to mean the procedure that would have
been followed if the election had been held on
that date." Id., at 394.

235

This conclusion was based net

-:;;r-- reach-o£
language.

~5";

but on

o~

the plain reading of the section's

~

f u r;.t=h-e=r rna r e ,

It is,

underlying policy.

"

a desire to maximize

in accord with the Act's

Section 5 was intended to halt actual

retrogression in minority voting strength without regard

~~/a~
for

the

legality

of

the

practices

already

in

effect.

2.1

A.

6 since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we
consider the system that would have been in ef feet if
there had been an election then. That, presumably, is the
system that was used without exception between 1917 and
1973.
See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 u.s. 379, 394-395
(1971).

240
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s recogn1ze
would

be

declares

that many of the

independently
that

actionable,
a

preclearance

action to enjoin

Section 5 is

a

actions.
of

245 '

of new practices that leav

minority voters

a

subseque t

maintaining

the

status

It is

quo

"

until

have a chance to

250

B

F~ We " =er
new

system to which

compared

to

the

;

. ~

whether the aspects of the

the Attorney General objected, when

practices

~ ally

in

use

in

Lockhart

prior to the new charter, have the ef feet of denying or
abridging the right to vote

,.~.:/e:t-f:s!. '!::ror,

mamee :f-oa bip --.i n a laRE}uage mino r ity group.

Of"

Our inquiry is

guided by the principles of Beer v. United States, supra. 8

7we

also believe that the Attorney General and the
District Court for the District of Columbia should be free
to decide preclearance questions on the essentially
factual issues of discriminatory purpose and effect.
We
doubt
that Congress
intended to force
either
into
npliealed !IIH' G1C% Qf state law.
Footnote(s) 8 will appear on following pages.
[

~~~~J4,

255 '
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I

260 I
'

As noted above, Beer involved the reapportionment
of the New Orleans councilmanic districts.
reapportionment,
population

in

black
only

citizens

one

of

had

the

a

five

majority

and a voter majority in one.

·~
11

the

and

a

Under the new
265

population majority in two districts

blacks had a

( r)")A..

-<S.i: i

of

districts

majority of the registered voters in none.
plan,

Prior to the

"J ,.1
Although the new

._f.,

d'scriminato t y as the old plan.

was

'

d i sc r imina tory >f-f-C=aui-Ln~s;>.Jt~o.---u.J.4..1.,;..11i..a

r~

tl

plan~

not , ...e Q

;--

71--~~~
We
~ held

was entitled to §5 preclearance.

that

the ~

plan

As we explained, "[t]he
;

language of §5 clearly provides that it applies only to
proposed changes in voting procedures."
" [T] he purpose of

§

5 has

/

270

425 U.S., at 138.

always been to

insure that no

'-

voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to
a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with
respect

to

their

franchise."

Id.,

effective

exercise

of

the

electoral

d.e..~~

against

at

141.

Since

the ,_, discrimination

U!!l<A:Zi~~
black~ was
wGr ~ nder New Orleans's
RO

new plan

8 cano argues on appeal that the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131
(1982), altered the Beer standard. The District Court did
not pass on this argument, and we decline to review it in
the first instance. This issue remains open on remand.

275
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than under its old
We apply these principles to the three aspects of
,....._~~

the

new

system

that

the

Attorney

General

refused

to

280

'\

preclear:

at-large

elections,

and staggered terms

recognized
against

that

for

Lockhart)

numbered

councilmen.

at-large

minorities,

the

where racial block

system,

The first of

elections

particularly

post

in

may
a

~

these

discriminate

city

(such

as

285

9
votin~edominatef.
1\.

e.g., United States Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting
Act:

~ ~ ~ a.v-t.permits

the

Such a

(1975)

majority

to

win

system

Yf.:> ~ ~-0/{ /. ~·u~

~ of

~

election~. 10

c.,-~

~<-

~

Elections by districts, on the other hand, ~ permit a ~(.
I

concentration of minority voters to elect a candidate of

290

h ...-1!.
1

~~

It)
-.J

their

choice

in

one

of

the

districts.

In

Lockhart,

9 The

elimination of at-large elections was one of the
issues in Cano v. Kirksey, supra. {ES §5 makes cle
, a
""·· •.Jvl.. ...
declaratory Judgment in this case w1ll
a local
'I'Y""""~ istrict
Court
from
fi
·
a
the new election
~ ~ -~ ~
rocedures
nst1tutional, or that they violate some
1~ ~
pr
· 10n of federal law other than §5 :J

J.re- . ~~

10

The majority may still lose an election if its votes
are divided.
In 1978, a Mexican-American was elected to
~
the City Council for the first time in Lockhart's history.
~ Standing for "councilman place one," he obtained virtually
~
all of the Mexican-American votes, and defeated four other
~
,
candidates who divided the remaining votes.
~ .A""

~ r~.

tvHp.:IV" , vU tYV'

~7~;.,.~
w

first draft: Lockhart v. United States

however, ~ elections ~~ alwaysl

page 17.

been at-large,

';t!

the

minorities are in no worse /position now than they were
before

the 1973 charter.

recognized this,

for

The District Court apparently

295

it did not hold that the continued

existence of at-large elections had a retrogrssive effect.
Nor

do

~

any

continued

of

the

parties

existence

of

~-a~~
us ...( ~

before

at-large

elections

that

the

~
..b..e\4

a

retrogrssive effect.
Our
similar.

300

analysis with

a~tt~

OR-GQ

j t

respect

to numbered posts is

is well recognized that such a

system may discriminate against minorities in a city where
.See, e, 9. , id, , at 206·· ~

racial block voting predominates.

~-

"""'~

Use of numbered posts" frustrate1 the use of "single-

vrt.Iicz

shot voting,"

t'6 a

HuJ-

technique permi t~s
l'l

~ concentrat~~support

305

I.

"'

behind a

single candidate.

9;,. ,...,._ ~A-h.D h:-t../,rumbered

~

posts

head-to-head
candidates.

races,

tend

to

highlight

to

the

the

detriment

individual,
of

As with at-large elections, however, Lockhart

used numbered posts before the 1973 charter.
voting

may

minority

be
under

impossible
the

old

now,
system.

but
The

it
new

Single-shot
was

equally

system

may

310
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page 18.

highlight individual races, but so did the old.

In short,

minorities are in no worse a position now than they were
before the 1973 charter.
we qrQ

£~

315

Applying the principles of Beer,

to conclude that the District Court

~Y

erred in finding that the continued use of numbered posts
had a retrogressive effect on minority voting strength.
a~,.;_,
~ 1he
use
of
staggered

may

terms

a

have

320

discriminatory effect under some circumstances. (
Lockhart's

prior

system

had

elections without numbered posts for four c
two years,
be

a change to the present s aggered terms might

impermissible.

opportunity

ncilmen every

Such

for

would
voting.

.....z.e-s..

Se-e,

reduce

e.g.,

at

numbered-post elections every two
present

years

Such

staggered

terms

would

a

might

further

~~
But n-either -of t:fiese.-f change;

place in Lockhart.
two

~,

the

at-large

years.

also

be

highligh
has taken

Under the old system, the voters faced

elections

with

numbered

posts

every

two

Now they face two at-large elections with numbered

posts every year.

The inability to use single-shot voting

330
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is identical.

The degree of individual race highlighting

is identical.

Minorities are in the same position every

year that they used to be in every other year.
there

may

have

been

no

improvement

in

335

Although

their

voting

strength, there has been no retrogression, either.
Cano

argues

that

the

increased

frequency

of

340

elections made necessary by staggered terms has resulted

~~-;· .J
in

retrogress ion.

reduce

voter

The

more

turn-out,

and

frequent
this

impact on minority voters.

has

elections 1'\ t:em3
a

disproportionate

In support of this argument,

he cites figures from the April 1975 election.
when voter

to

That year,

345

turn-out was unusually low, only 5. 7% of the

voters were Mexican-Americans.

In other years since 1973,

the percentage of Mexican-American voters has been three
to

six

times

misleading.

as
In

great.

the

These

figures,

1975

election,

April

candidates were running unopposed,
was Mexican-American.
lower

overall

overall

turn-out

and

For other
and

both

are

council

350

and neither candidate

This undoubtedly explains both the

turn-out

Mexican-Americans.

however,

the

the

lower

elections

turn-out
since

Mexican-American

among

1973,

the

turn-out

has

355
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been

consistently

charter,

higher

despite

increased

only

the

than

fact

that

In

slightly.

it

was

before

the

new

the

population

has

1978,

a

candidate was elected in Lockhart for
its history,
record,

after

five

therefore,

Mexican-American
the first time in

years of annual elections.

contradicts

Cano's

argument.

The

360

Once

again, we are- ~ ~lude that the District Court
was

ele~~~otts

in finding that the introduction of

1\

staggered

terms

had

a

retrogressive

effect

on minority
365

voting strength.

IV
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States,
we conclude

that

the

election changes

introduced by the

---

1973 Lockhart City Charter will not have the effect of

370

denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race,

!rl'1\

----

color~

o.L mem~WftgJ.l-.ge-

miR&Eity- grQPp.

.s
District
erroneous.
judgment,

Court's
We
and

finding

"

~

to

accordingly
remand

the

The

the

contrary

vacate
case

consistent with this opinion.

for

the

~

District

further

""\

clearly
Court's

proceedings
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It is so ordered.

OSCAR GINA-POW
December 6, 1982

From: "
Subjecti

City of

81-802

~.

I~ckhart

v. United

States ·~

'(

'

¢

. I was able Saturday, for the first time, to review your
~

• ·1

•

first draft in this ~ase.

+ wi11 .. want

good.

c.

Generally, I think it is quite

to' review a second draft more carefully,

. ..•. ,F,
~lme ' is t

when·' more

available. I have, however, done ~ a fair
·.~~ ~
amount of stylistic editing personal to me. Additiona b
; ~ l'~g"'

d

~~

~~ '~t~Jtf: ~

1:~,

comments ar e:-~ as ' follow: .-.,
1.

You have stated the case quite well in Part I.

I

,. ' II"

also like ~'he organization of the opinion. "
2.

Part

II ~ is
!

~

fine, subject to two suqgestions.

prefer ~, not to cite 1Ulen.

I

Nhen I first came to this Court,

I said in a couple of Section 5 cases that I agreed with
Justices Black and Harlan as to the extreme way in which a
maiority of the Court construed

ss.

Justice Brennan's use

of "even a minor way" and "however small" in Allen have
created the absurd situation identified briefly in my Port
~.

~~!;·~

'
.J

I,:"~C

Arthur dissent:

Some 66 "changes" come to the Department of

Justice every working day.
Attorney
judgment.

Genera~

~his

means, of course, that the

almost never exercises any personal '

Rather, unidentifiable bureaucrats are making ,

personal decisions that overrule political judgments , made
by state and local governments - however innocuous the
question may be.

To be sure,

2.

essentially for political reasons that illustrate the power
of the minority vote in this country - have endorsed Allen.
I recoqnize and follow Allen rule, but don't want to bless
it by direct quotation.

You can simply state that it is

settled law that the changes here must clear.
The other comment is a

respon~e

to your inquiry as to

whether the paragraphs between lines 161 and 196 merit the
present attention of textual treatment.
inference that they do not.

I would he

I agree with your
inclin~d

to leave

the first of these two paragraphs out entirely, and releqate
the second to a footnote.
3.

Sub-part IliA is O.K.

4.

The critical pages are 14-18

(Sub-~artsB).

Generally, I approve the way you have written these.

As you

will note, I do have certain reservations and questions:
(a) On paqe 15, you say that
"still discriminatory".

t~e

new plan in Beer was

Did the Court say this expressly?

(b) I have not had an opportunity to reread Chief Judge
Robinson's dissent in this case.
that there was no "regression"?

Did hP qo heyond saying
My recollection is that

some of the ,Justices, if not ,ludge Robinson, considereo that
the annual elections enhanced the opportunity of minorities
to participate.

At least this seems arguable to me.

(c) At a personal level, I have omitted the citations
to the United States Commission on Civil Rights.

It has

been dominated over the years, as one would expect, by

~·s

3.

<f,l

members who tend to fi.nd discr i.mination in whatever is done
in some states.
•

, " (d)

,.,,,

f•l ··~

,,::\(

.I

'T'ake a look at what I satd about majority

elections i.n my Port Arthur

dissent ;~

'rhe minority vote in

many state and city elections not only "influences" but
often controls the outcome where the contestants are nonminority candidates. \ In such a situation, each of the
candidates

seek~

to win the minority vote because it tends

to be delivered as a bloc.

.~.

l

"

Of cours'e , in .' head to head

'

.f

.:.'.:

t'
'<'I

contests between a black and a white, the situation is

...

·.:

different in an at-large election if there are a majority of
white voters.

Should we say this in this case?
**It

in order to move this forward, that you do
second draft at your convenience that
and resoonse to my suggestions.

·~·

~-

"' '1.);'

:;fC

,.'!-. '·I

2-'·~:· '~

my editing

Of course, Mike, I always

am willing to discuss any changes.
'~

~ eflects

~.
·f"

OSCAR GINA-POW
December 6, 1982
To:

Mike

From:

LFP, Jr.

Subject:

81-802

City of Lockhart v. United States

I was able Saturday, for the first time, to review your
first draft in this case.
good.

Generally, I think it is quite

I will want to review a second draft more carefully,

when more time is available.

I have, however, done a fair

amount of stylistic editing personal to me.

Additional

comments are as follow:
1.

You have stated the case quite well in Part I.

I

also like the organization of the opinion.
2.

Part II is fine, subject to two suggestions.

prefer not to cite Allen.

I

When I first carne to this Court,

I said in a couple of Section 5 cases that I agreed with
Justices Black and Harlan as to the extreme way in which a
majority of the Court construed §5.

Justice Brennan's use

of "even a minor way" and "however small" in Allen have
created the absurd situation identified briefly in my Port
Arthur dissent:

Some 66 "changes" come to the Department of

Justice every working day.

This means, of course, that the

Attorney General almost never exercises any personal
judgment.

Rather, unidentifiable bureaucrats are making

personal decisions that overrule political judgments

made
-~

by state and local governments - however innocuous the
changes in question may be.

.

To be sure, Congress -

-.

2.

..•

.

essentially for political reasons that illustrate the power
of the minority vote in this country - have endorsed Allen.
JA...<
14..<.~
I recognize and follow Allen rule, but don't want to bless ~
A

it by direct quotation.

You can simply state that it is

.,,.

settled law that the changes here must clear.
The other comment is a response to your inquiry as to

;. ·

whether the paragraphs between lines 161 and 196 merit the
present attention of textual treatment.
inference that they do not.

I agree with your

I would be inclined to leave

the first of these two paragraphs out entirely, and relegate
the second to a footnote.

." ..

3.

Sub-part IliA is O.K.

4.

The critical pages are 14-18 (Sub-partsB).

Generally, I approve the way you have written these.

As you

will note, I do have certain reservations and questions:
(a) On page 15, you say that the new plan in Beer was
"still discriminatory".

Did the Court say this expressly?

(b) I have not had an opportunity to reread Chief Judge
Robinson's dissent in this case.
that there was no "regression"?

Did he go beyond saying
My recollection is that

some of the Justices, if not Judge Robinson, considered that
the annual elections enhanced the opportunity of minorities
to participate.

At least this seems arguable to me.

(c) At a personal level, I have omitted the citations

.!,

..

•. 4"'1'

to the United States Commission on Civil Rights.

It has

been dominated over the years, as one would expect, by

..

3.

members who tend to find discrimination in whatever is done
in some states.
(d) Take a look at what I said about majority vote
elections in my Port Arthur dissent.

The minority vote in .

many state and city elections not only "influences" but
often controls the outcome where the contestants are nonminority candidates.

In such a situation, each of the

candidates seeks to win the minority vote because it tends
to be delivered as a bloc.

Of course, in head to head

contests between a black and a white, the situation is

'·

different in an at-large election if there are a majority of
white voters.

Should we say this in this case?

***
I suggest, in order to move this forward, that you do a
second draft at your convenience that reflects my editing
and response to my suggestions.

Of course, Mike, I always

am willing to discuss any changes.

;:, 1-:iJ,

L.F.P. JR.

';

,"

'

mfs 12/09/82
To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:

Lockhart opinion

Attached is a second draft of the Lockhart opinion.

I

have considered your comments, and Mark has provided valuable
editorial assistance.

I

There are a few points that you should

particularly note:
1.

Twice you were concerned about the language "race,

color, or membership in a language minority group."
ed changing it to "race or color."

You suggest-

I agree that "race or color"

sounds better, and makes the opinion seem less complicated, but I
have nevertheless retained the original language for the time
being.

There are two points you should consider before taking

out the "language minority group" reference.

First, the Act was

amended in 1975 to cover language minority groups explicitly.
Thus it is not accurate to say only that the changes must have no
discriminatory purpose or effect with respect to race or color.
Second, and more important, I think

the~levant

minority here

(Mexican-Americans) is viewed as a language minority rather than
as a race or color minority.

According to the Texas census fig-

ures, "[p]ersons of Spanish origin [98% of whom are MexicanAmerican in Lockhart] may be of any race."

The breakdown for

people of Spanish origin, in fact, is 70.74% white, 0.71% black,
and 28.55% "other races".

At the very least, over 70% of Lock-

hart's Mexican-Americans are white.

It seems we should not limit

scrutiny to discrimination on the basis of race or color.

I

2•

.

I

Several of the more difficult problems in the first
~\

/{

draft were in the section on at-large elections.

You were con-

cerned that the opinion might be rea

per se rule

against at-large elections.

I was concerned that it might be

read to preempt CAS's decision in Cano v. Kirksey.

Mark points

out, correctly I think, that we really need not deal with / the
issue.

(The reason I origi-

No one is arguing about it anymore.

~---------------------------nally included
it was to stress that our inquiry is limited to
the parts of the plan that were not precleared by the A-G.

JUS-

TICE WHITE's and JUSTICE BLACKMON's clerks argue that aspects of
the plan are discriminatory despite the A-G's failure to object
to them.

But I think this point is clear enough without a de-

tailed discussion of at-large elections.)

New footnote 10

dis- ~~-----

poses of the issue in a single sentence.

~·

Beer did not expressly say that the new plan in New

Orleans was still discriminatory, although the statement of facts
left me with that clear impression.

I think your reformulation

of my sentence is a fairer statement of Beer.

~

I do not read Judge Robinson's dissent as saying

that annual elections would enhance the position of minorities.
There may be increased Mexican-American participation, but the
Court should hesitate to attribute this to annual elections.

/j

fact, I think this issue is our weakest point.

In

It has been true

in other places that more frequent elections resulted in a lower
voter turn-out, and the lower turn-out was disproportionate among
minorities.

That has not happened in Lockhart, but we really

have no idea why not.

j.

I think JUSTICES WHITE and BLACKMON justly can argue as
follows:

{i) Mexican-American participation was increasing in the

early '70s; {ii) the City introduced more frequent elections;
{iii) Mexican-American participation continued to increase, but
the more frequent elections tend to reduce voter turn-out, so the
increase has not been so great as it otherwise would have been;
{iv) Mexican-Americans are therefore worse off under the new systern than they would have been under the old.

This scenario is

conjecture, but the burden of proof is on the City, and the City
did not prove much of anything.
We probably can withstand this argument, but it would
seem to be pushing our luck to say that minorities are better off {
with more frequent elections.

It may, in fact, be true here, but

on the present record it is still conjecture.

Since the burden

is on the City, and the City has not proven it, we might be going
out

o~limb

5.

to make the argument.
I have looked at your Port Arthur dissent, but do

not think there should be similar statements here, primarily because the current record does not support them.

There has been

racial bloc voting by Mexican-Americans in favor of MexicanAmerican candidates, but there is no indication of bloc voting in
favor of any other candidates.

When no Mexican-American candi-

date stands, it seems the Mexican-Americans either do not vote or
split their vote.
6.

You put a question mark next to old footnote 8 {new

footnote 9), which disposes of the §2 issue, but did not explain

~

4.

why you questioned it.

I understand the majority's desire to be

a remand on the issue.

Your notes express your views as follows:

The §2 issue was not addressed in this case, & we
could say simply that it is not before us.
I'd not object to noting that on remand the DC may
consider whether §2 properly may be considered & by
what court.
Given your disinclination to deal with §2, I included this footnote to dispose of the issue as quickly as possible.
7.

Mark questions whether it is necessary to include

footnote 2, which sets out the relevant parts of §5.

~

He points

out that we explain the relevant portions in text.

My preference

is to include the §5 language, despite its length.

My prime rea-

son is that the textual summaries are accurate but not rigorous.
\
For example, the text says "[covered jurisdictions] may submit
the changes to the Attorney General, who then has sixty days in
which to object."

I think this generalization is all that is

needed for the text, but I feel more comfortable leaving it at

~

that when the actual language of §5 is included in footnote 2.
I assume that most readers will have access to §5 in
u.s.c. or u.s.c.A., so it is probably not essential to include it
in a footnote.

But it seems to be the Court's practice to quote

relevant statutes, and I think that many readers find it more
convenient.

Even in the first draft I excised the irrelevant

portions of §5.

That not only cut down the length considerably,

it made the footnote easier to follow.
this shortened version.

I recommend retaining

~

1-z-,

S...e.tL.Jufs.

---S: P, '1, lt!J ,tJ
..._..

__..

~

~

Lockhart v. United States

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue in this case is the application of §5

~~i..tA-u~f

5

of the Voting Rights Act to the election plan adopted by _ ~

~~J.U.IL~~

appellant City of Lockhart in 1973.

~~

~vf
~~---~~~...........~~

~!J.r~
~~·

k
I

The City of Lockhart is a community of just under

10

8,000 people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south
of Austin.

According to the most recent census figures,

almost 47% of the City's population are Mexican-American.
As

of

1977,

however,

fewer

than

30%

of

the

City's
15

registered voters were Mexican-American.
Before 1973, Lockhart was a

"general-law" city.

Under Texas law, general-law cities have only those powers
that the State specifically permits them to possess.
authorized

by

State

law,

Lockhart

was

governed

by

As
a

commission consisting of a mayor and two commissioners,
all serving the same two-year terms.

These offices were

20
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filled

in April of even-numbered years through at-large

elections
system,

using

the

a

two

"numbered-post"

commissioner

posts

system.

Under

this

were

designated

by

number, and each candidate for commissioner specified the
post for which he or she sought election.
was

effectively

a

separate

election

25

Thus each race
for

a

separate

office. 1
In

1973,

Lockhart

became a "horne-rule" city.

adopted

a

new

charter,

and

In contrast to a general-law

30

city, a horne-rule city has authority to do whatever is not
specifically

prohibited

by

the

State.

This

includes

discretion to define the form of city government and to
establish the procedures for city elections.

As part of

its new charter, Lockhart chose to be governed by a city
council consisting of a mayor and four councilmen serving
staggered
councilmen

two-year
are

terms.

elected

The

in April

mayor
of

and

two

of

the

even-numbered years

through at-large elections using the numbered-post system.

1This numbered post system may be contrasted with a
system in which all of the candidates for the two
commissioner posts run in a single election, and the two
receiving the greatest number of votes are elected.

35
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The other

in odd-

two councilmen are

similarly elected

numbered years.
Under
Stat.

439,

jurisdictions

§5 of

as

the Voting Rights Act of 1965,

amended,

may

enforce

42

u.s.c.

certain

§1973c, 2
changes

79

covered
in

2 section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
[W]henever a State or political subdivision
[such as Lockhart]
shall enact or seek to
administer
any
voting
qualification
or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure with respect to voting different
from that in force or effect on November 1,
1972, such State or subdivision may institute an
action in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia for a declaratory
judgment that such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure does not have
the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color, or in contravention of
the guarantees set forth in section 4 (f) (2)
[§1973b(f) (2)
(prohibiting
discrimination
against members of language minority groups)] ,
and unless and until the court enters such
judgment no person shall be denied the right to
vote
for
failure
to
comply
with
such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice,
or
procedure:
Provided,
That
such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice,
or procedure may be enforced without such
proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite,
standard,
practice,
or
procedure
has
been
submitted by the chief legal officer or other
appropritate
official
of
such
State
or
subdivision to the Attorney General and the
Attorney General has not interposed an objection
within sixty days after such submission
Neither
an
affirmative
indication
by · the
Attorney General that no objection will be made,
nor the Attorney General's failure to object,
nor a declaratory judgment entered under this
section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin
enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite,
standard,
practice,
or procedure.
Any
action under this section shall be heard and
determined by a court of three judges in
accordance with the provisions of [28 U.S.C.
§2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme
Court.

their

40
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election laws only after obtaining "preclearance"
of two ways:
the

United

in one

45

(i) they may obtain a declaratory judgment in
States

District

Court

for

the

District

of

Columbia that the changes do not have the purpose and will
not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote

on

language

account

of

minority

race,

group,

color,

or

(ii)

or

membership

they

may

in

submit

a

50

the

changes to the Attorney General, who then has sixty days
in which to object.

The Act 1 s coverage was extended to

the State of Texas in 1975, covering changes in election
procedure from those in effect on November 1, 1972.

See :

~

55

4 0 Fed . Reg . 4 3 7 4 6 ( 19 7 5 ) •
In

1977,

four

Mexican-Americans,

including

appellee Alfred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of
Lockhart 1 s

elect ion

Cano

v.

Kirksey,

Oct.

8,

1982),

No.

82-1616

that
never

suit,

obtained

instituted

No.

under

A-77-CA-133

filed Nov. 8, 1982).

plaintiffs
approval

in 1973.

the

(W.D.

appeal pending sub nom.

(CAS,
the

procedures

197 3

charter.

Tex.,

dismissed

Cano v.

Chessar,

In the course of

discovered

that

Lockhart had

under

for

the

§5

6C

changes

A second suit then was brought

to

6
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enjoin

the City

from

using

the

pending the required approval.

page 5.

new election procedures

The United States District

Court for the Western District of Texas granted injunctive
relief. 3

Cano v.

Mar. 2, 1979)
Once
approval,

Chessar,

No.

A-79-CA-00 32

(W. D.

Tex. ,

(three-judge court).
future

Lockhart

General, however,

70

elections were enjoined pending
sought

preclearance.

The

§5

Attorney

interposed an objection to the election

procedures under the 1973 charter to the extent that they
incorporate at-large elections, the numbered-post system,
and staggered terms for councilmen.

75

Lockhart then filed : '

the present suit for a declaratory judgment in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia.
intervened as a defendant.

As required by §5,

a

Cano
three-

judge court was convened to decide the case.
The

District

Court,

recognizing

8

that

the

City

3 rn granting the injunction, the District Court lacked
jurisdiction to pass on the discriminatory purpose or
effect of the changes. All it could do was determine (1)
whether a change was covered by §5, (2) if the change was
covered,
whether
§5's
approval
requirements
were
satisfied, and (3) if the requirements were not satisfied,
what remedy was appropriate.
See, e.g., United States v.
Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429 u.s. 642, 645647 (1977)
(per curiam).
Lockhart did not appeal the
District Court's finding that the 1973 charter i-m~e:!"ed
changes that are covered by §5.
~ ""

L
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must prove both the absence of discriminatory effect and
discriminatory purpose, bifurcated the trial.
only the first issue,

Addressing

it held, over the dissent of Chief

Judge Spottswood Robinson, of the United States Court of
Appeals

for

Lockhart 1 s

the

District

elect ion

of

procedures

Columbia
have

Circuit,
the

that

ef feet

discriminating against protected minorities. 4

85

of

The court

first decided that the entire election plan was subject to
§5 1 s

requirements.

It

then compared Lockhart 1 s

current

90

system to that used before the 1973 charter, except that
the court

refused

numbered posts.
use of

to recognize

the City 1 s

This was justified on the ground that the

numbered posts was

not explicitly authorized

Texas law,

and thus was illegal for

The

concluded

court

prior use of

terms each had a

that

numbered

di scr imina tory

by

a general-law city.
posts

impact,

and

staggered

particularly in

view of the history of racial block voting in Lockhart.
Chief Judge Robinson, in dissent, agreed with the

4 In view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it
was unnecessary for the District Court to reach the issue
of discriminatory purpose.
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majority that Lockhart's city council election procedures
were

subject

numbered

to

posts

§5
and

preclearance,
staggered

and

terms

that

the

tended

to

use

curb

ability of minorities to elect minority candidates.

u.s.

relying on Beer v. United States, 425
concluded

that

there

was

no

100

of
the
But

130 (1976), he

retrogression

in

minority

105

voting strength.
The

City

appealed

the

judgment

to

this Court,

contending that the District Court misconstrued the scope
of

§5,

and

retrogression
States,

that,
in

in

any

minority

which defended

event,
voting

the

there

has

strength.

suit below,

been

The

no

United

110

now agrees with

Lockhart that the changes have no retrogressive effect on
the voting rights of Mexican-Americans.
defend the result below.

u.s.
judgment,

(1982).
and

remand

Cano continues to

We noted probable jurisdiction.

We now vacate the District Court's
the

case

for

further

115

proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

II

We consider first the scope of §5's coverage in

120
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the circumstances of this case.
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Lockhart concedes that §5

applies to its electoral changes, and that the addition of
two seats to its governing body and the introduction of
staggered

terms

are

covered

changes.

It

contends,

however,

that §5 does not apply to the "continuation" of

the

old

two

places.

We

seats

and

conclude

the

that

continued

use

of

125

numbered

there has been a change with

respect to the "continuation" of the two old seats.
By
Lockhart

introducing

has

changed

posts

new

system

the nature of

Council posts one and
commission

a

one

two are not
and

two.

of

government,

the seats at
identical

For

example,

issue.

130

to the old
they

now

constitute only 40% of the council, rather than 67% of the
commission.

Moreover 1

seats in isolation,

( ].. .t;

(/"}U._~ J
: is

impo5-8'H3J..e

to

view

these

for they are an integral part of the

council.

The possible discriminatory purpose or effect of

the

seats,

new

admittedly

subject

to

§5,

cannot

135

be

determined in isolation from the "preexisting" elements of
the council. 5

We

therefore hold that the entire system

.'

5 Lockhart seeks to rely on Beer v. United States, 425
u.s. 130
(1976) ,
but
that
decision
is
readily
Footnote continued on next page.
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introduced in the 1973 charter is subject to preclearance.

140

III
Having

decided

that

Lockhart's

entire

1973

election plan is subject to §5, we now determine whether
the changes
precleared

implemented by the plan that have not been
by

the

Attorney

General

have

the

145

effect of

denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race,
color, or membership in a language minority group.

Tk j
.-OM'

comparison.

first

150

A

step

is

to

identify

the

appropriate

The District Court compared the new plan to

distinguishable on this point. In Beer, we considered the
reapportionment of the New Orleans councilmanic districts.
The New Orleans City Council was composed of seven
members, two elected at-large and five elected from
councilmanic districts.
New Orleans had reapportioned
these districts through a city ordinance.
"The ordinance
... made no reference to the at-large councilmanic seats.
Indeed, since those seats had been established •.. by the
city charter, an ordinance could not have altered them:
any change in the charter would have required approval by
the city's voters."
Id. , at 138-139.
Furthermore, the
ordinance did not affect the at-large councilmen in any
other way.
It did not change their titles.
It did not
increase or decrease the size of the city council.
In
short,
the
ordinance
affected
only
the
district
councilmen.
It was only in these circumstances that
"[t]he at-large seats .•. were not subject to review .•.
under §5." Id., at 139.

,.

··'
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what

numbered

the old practice would

posts.

have been without

It justified this comparison on the ground that a

general-law city such as Lockhart was not entitled, under
Texas

law,

to

distinguishing
(1971),
rather

use

a

numbered-post

Perkins

v.

Matthews,

The

system.
400

u.s.

155

court,

379,

394

reasoned that recognition of the actual practice
than the

legal requirement would reward the City

for its past illegality.

It preferred instead to draw its

160

comparison in a way that would maximize the reach of §5.
Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 6
but that is essentially irrelevant.
is

between

the

new

system

and

The proper comparison

the

system

actually

in

effect on November 1, 1972, 7 regardless of what state law

165 ·

~~~ J

might have required.
Matthews,

supra.

elect ion for

This ~was

There

a

established in Perkins v.

city

conducted

the

relevant

aldermen by wards, despite a state statute

6There does not appear to be any Texas case-law on the
subject.
Lockhart had used its numbered post system for
over
fifty
years
without
challenge,
suggesting
a
presumption of regularity under state law.
7 since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we
consider the system that would have been in ef feet if
there had been an election then. That, presumably, is the
system that was used without exception between 1917 and
1973.
See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 u.s. 379, 394-395
(1971) .

..
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requiring

at-large

elections.

As

the

Perkins

Court

explained:

170

In our view, § 5' s reference to the procedure
'in force or effect on November 1, 19[72] ,' must
be taken to mean the procedure that would have
been followed if the election had been held on
that date. 11 Id., at 394.
11

This

conclusion was

section's language.

based

on

the

plain

It is, moreover,

Act's underlying policy.

reading of

175

the

in accord with the

180

Section 5 was intended to halt

actual retrogression in minority voting strength without
regard for the legality under state law of the practices
already in effect. 8
185
B

We now consider whether
system

to

which

the

Attorney

the aspects of the new
General

objected,

when

compared to the practices in use in Lockhart prior to the
new charter, have the effect of denying or abridging the

8 we also believe that the Attorney General and the
District Court for the District of Columbia should be free
to decide preclearance questions on the essentially
factual issues of discriminatory purpose and effect.
We
doubt
that Congress
intended to force either
into
speculation as to state law.

190
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right to vote guaranteed by §5.
the

principles of

Beer

v.

Our inquiry is guided by

United States,

4 25

U.S.

130

of

the

New

{1976) . 9
Beer
Orleans

involved

the

councilmanic

reapportionment,
population

in

black
only

reapportionment

districts.
citizens

one

of

Prior

had

the

a

five

majority

the

of

districts

majority of the registered voters in none.
plan,

to

195

the

and

a

Under the new

blacks had a population majority in two districts

and a voter majority in one.

Although the new plan may

have

it nevertheless was not a

remained discriminatory,

regressive change.

The Court accordingly held

plan was entitled to §5 preclearance.
.. [t]he

language

of

§5

clearly provides

11

the

As we explained,
that

only to proposed changes in voting procedures ...
at 138.

that

20 0

it

applies

425

u.s.,

205

[T] he purpose of § 5 has always been to insure

that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would
lead

~

~

to

a

retrogression

~

the

position

of

racial

9 cano argues on appeal that the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131
{1982), altered the Beer standard. The District Court did
not pass on this argument, and we decline to review it in
the first instance. This issue remains open on rema ~

~~~
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minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the
electoral franchise."

Id.,

did

degree

not

increase

the

at 141.
of

Since the new plan

discrimination

210

against

blacks, §5's requirements were satisfied.
We apply these principles to the two aspects of
the

new

system that

remain at

issue

in

this case:

the

numbered-post system and staggered terms for councilmen. 10
It

is

recognized

that

a

numbered-post

.L~ ~ ~f' Pf ~~~~'fii'-V&~
d~cr

against minorities

im-inat.e

in

a

system

v

city

where

215

may

racial

1\
block

voting

frustrate
that

predominates.

the

use

permits

candidate.
highlight

of

Use

of

numbered

"single-shot voting,"

concentrating

of

support

posts
a

may

technique

behind

a

single

It also is argued that numbered posts tend to
the

individual,

head-to-head

races,

to

the

detriment of minority candidates.

Lockhart used numbered

posts,

however,

before

1973

charter.

voting

may

impossible

now,

but

impossible

220

be
under

the

the

old

system.

The

it
new

Single-shot
was

equally

system

may

10 The Attorney General also objected to the use of atlarge elections, but the District Court did not hold, and
the parties before us do not argue, that the continued
existence of at-large elections has a retrogressive
effect.
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highlight individual races, but so did the old.

In short,

minorities are in no worse a position now than they were
before the 1973 charter.

Applying the principles of Beer,

we conclude that the District Court erred in finding that

230

the continued use of numbered posts has a retrogressive
effect on minority voting strength.
The

use

of

staggered

terms

also

may

have

a

discriminatory effect under some circumstances, since it,
too,
or

might reduce the opportunity for single-shot voting
tend

to

highlight

introduction of

staggered

individual
terms

has

races.
not

voting strength of Lockhart's minorities.
system,

the

numbered

posts every two years.

large

voters

elections

inability

to

use

faced

with

two

numbered

single-shot

at-large

But

diminished

voting

elections

every
is

the
the

Under the old

Now they face
posts

235

with

two at-

year.

The

identical.

The

240

degree of highlighting of individual races is identical.
Minorities are in the same position every year that they
used to be in every other year.
been no improvement

Although there may have

in their voting strength,

been no retrogression, either.

there has

245
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Cano

argues

that

the

page 15.

increased

frequency

of

elections made necessary by staggered terms has resulted
in retrogression.
reduce

voter

The more frequent elections are said to

turn-out,

and

this

impact on minority voters.

has

a

250

disproportionate

In support of this argument,

he cites figures from the April 1975 election.

That year,

when voter turn-out was unusually low, only 5.7% of the
voters were Mexican-Americans.

In other years since 1973,

255

the percentage of Mexican-American voters has been three
to

six

times

misleading.

as
In

great.

the

These

figures,

1975

election,

April

candidates were running unopposed,
was Mexican-American.
lower

overall

overall
been

turn-out

For
and

consistently

charter,
increased

despite
only

and
other

the

higher
the

the

lower

turn-out

than

In

turn-out

the
has

it

was

before

the

new

that

the

population

has

1978,

a

Mexican-American
the first time in

five years of annual elections.

260

among

elections since 1973,

Mexican-American

fact

slightly.

after

council

and neither candidate

candidate was elected in Lockhart for
its history,

both

are

This undoubtedly explains both the

turn-out

Mexican-Americans.

however,

The

265
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record,

therefore,

contradicts

page 16.

Cano's

argument.

The

District Court erred in finding that the introduction of
staggered

terms

had

a

retrogressive

effect

270

on minority

voting strength.

IV

Applying the standards of Beer v. United States,

275

we conclude that the election changes introduced by the
1973 Lockhart City Charter will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race,
color,

or membership

District

Court's

erroneous.
judgment,

We
and

in a language minority group.

findings

to

accordingly
remand

the

the

contrary were

vacate
case

for

the

District

further

The

clearly

280

Court's

proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue in this case is the application of §5 of the
Voting Rights Act to the election plan adopted by appellant City
of Lockhart in 1973.

I

The City of Lockhart is a community of just under 8,000
people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south of Austin.
According to the most recent census figures, almost 47% of the
City's population are Mexican-American.

As of 1977, however,

fewer than 30% of the City's registered voters were MexicanAmerican.
Before 1973, Lockhart was a "general law" city.

Under

Texas law, general-law cities have only those powers that the
State specifically permits them to possess.

As authorized by

State law, Lockhart was governed by a commission consisting of a
mayor and two commissioners, all serving the same two-year terms.
These offices were filled in April of even-numbered years through
at-large elections using a "numbered post" system.

Under this

system, the two commissioner posts were designated by number, and
each candidate for commissioner specified the post for which he
or she sought election.

Thus each race was effectively a sepa-

rate election for a separate office. 1

Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages.

2.

In 1973, Lockhart adopted a new charter, and became a
"home rule" city.

In contrast to a general-law city, a home-rule

city has authority to do whatever is not specifically prohibited
by the State.

This includes discretion to define the form of

city government and to establish the procedures for city elections.

As part of its new charter, Lockhart chose to be governed

by a city council consisting of a mayor and four councilmen serving staggered two-year terms.

The mayor and two of the council-

men are elected in April of even-numbered years through at-large
elections using the numbered-post system.

The other two council-

men are similarly elected in odd-numbered years.
Under §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1973c, 2 covered jurisdictions may enforce

1 This numbered post system may be contrasted with a system in
which all of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in
a single election, and the two receiving the greatest number of
votes are elected.
2 section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
[W]henever a State or political subdivision [such as
Lockhart] shall enact or seek to administer any voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting different
from that in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such
State or subdivision may institute an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not
have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set
forth in section 4 (f) (2) [§l973b(f) (2) (prohibiting
discrimination against members of language minority
groups}], and unless and until the court enters such
judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote
for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided,
Footnote continued on next page.

3.

certain changes in their election laws only after obtaining
"preclearance" in one of two ways:

(i) they may obtain a declara-

tory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that the changes do not have the purpose and
will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group, or (ii) they may submit the changes to the Attorney
General, who then has sixty days in which to object.

The Act's

coverage was extended to the State of Texas in 1975, covering
changes in election procedure from those in effect on November 1,
1972.

See 40 Fed. Reg. 43746

(1975).

In 1977, four Mexican-Americans, including appellee Alfred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of Lockhart's election procedures under the 1973 charter.

Cano v. Kirksey, No. A-

77-CA-133 (W.D. Tex., dismissed Oct. 8, 1982), appeal pending sub
nom. Cano v. Chessar, No. 82-1616 (CAS, filed Nov. 8, 1982).

That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief
legal officer or other appropritate official of such
State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the
Attorney General has not interposed an objection within
sixty days after such submission •... Neither an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no
objection will be made, nor the Attorney General's
failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment entered
under this section shall bar a subsequent action to
enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite,
standard, practice, or procedure . . . . Any action under
this section shall be heard and determined by a court
of three judges in accordance with the provisions of
[28 u.s.c. §2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.

In

4.

the course of that suit, the plaintiffs discovered that Lockhart
had never obtained approval under §5 for the changes instituted
in 1973.

A second suit then was brought to enjoin the City from

using the new election procedures pending the required approval.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted injunctive relief. 3
(W.D. Tex., Mar. 2, 1979)

Cano v. Chessar, No. A-79-CA-0032

(three-judge court).

Once future elections were enjoined pending §5 approval,
Lockhart sought preclearance.

The Attorney General, however,

interposed an objection to the election procedures under the 1973
charter to the extent that they incorporate at-large elections,
the numbered-post system, and staggered terms for councilmen.
Lockhart then filed the present suit for a declaratory judgment
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
Cano intervened as a defendant.

As required by §5, a three-judge

court was convened to decide the case.
The District Court, recognizing that the City must prove
both the absence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory
pose, bifurcated the trial.

pur~

Addressing only the first issue, it

held, over the dissent of Chief Judge Spottswood Robinson, of the

3 rn granting the injunction, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to pass on the discriminatory purpose or effect of the
changes. All it could do was determine (1) whether a change was
covered by §5, (2) if the change was covered, whether §5's approval requirements were satisfied, and (3) if the requirements
were not satisfied, what remedy was appropriate. See, e.g.,
United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429 u.s.
642, 645-647 (1977) (per curiam). Lockhart did not appeal the
District Court's finding that the 1973 charter included changes
that are covered by §5.

5.

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, that Lockhart's election procedures have the effect of discriminating against protected minorities. 4

The court first de-

cided that the entire election plan was subject to §5's requirements.

It then compared Lockhart's current system to that used

before the 1973 charter, except that the court refused to recognize the City's prior use of numbered posts.

This was justified

on the ground that the use of numbered posts was not explicitly
authorized by Texas law, and thus was illegal for a general-law
city.

The court concluded. that numbered posts and staggered

terms each had a discriminatory impact, particularly in view of
the history of racial block voting in Lockhart.
Chief Judge Robinson, in dissent, agreed with the majority that Lockhart's city council election procedures were subject
to §5 preclearance, and that the use of numbered posts and staggered terms tended to curb the ability of minorities to elect
minority candidates.

u.s.

But relying on Beer v. United States, 425

130 (1976), he concluded that there was no retrogression in

minority voting strength.
The City appealed the judgment to this Court, contending
that the District Court misconstrued the scope of §5, and that,
in any event, there has been no retrogression in minority voting
strength.

The United States, which defended the suit below, now

4 rn view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it was unnecessary for the District Court to reach the issue of discriminatory purpose.

6.

agrees with Lockhart that the changes have no retrogressive effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Americans.
to defend the result below.
U.S. ___ (1982).

Cano continues

We noted probable jurisdiction.

We now vacate the District Court's judgment,

and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

II
We consider first the scope of §5's coverage in the circumstances of this case.

Lockhart concedes that §5 applies to

its electoral changes, and that the addition of two seats to its
governing body and the introduction of staggered terms are covered changes.

It contends, however, that §5 does not apply to

the "continuation" of the two old seats and the continued use of
numbered places.

We conclude that there has been a change with

respect to the "continuation" of the two old seats.
By introducing a new system of government, Lockhart has
changed the nature of the seats at issue.

Council posts one and

two are not identical to the old commission posts one and two.
For example, they now constitute only 40% of the council, rather
than 67% of the commission.

Moreover, one cannot view these

seats in isolation, for they are an integral part of the council.
The possible discriminatory purpose or effect of the new seats,
admittedly subject to §5, cannot be determined in isolation from
the "preexisting" elements of the council. 5

We therefore hold

Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages.

7.

that the entire system introduced in the 1973 charter is subject
to preclearance.

III
Having decided that Lockhart's entire 1973 election plan
is subject to §5, we now determine whether the changes implemented by the plan that have not been precleared by the Attorney General have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race, color, or membership in a language minority
group.

A

The first step is to identify the appropriate comparison.

The District Court compared the new plan to what the old

practice would have been without numbered posts.

It justified

this comparison on the ground that a general-law city such as

5 Lockhart seeks to rely on Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130
(1976), but that decision is readily distinguishable on this
point.
In Beer, we considered the reapportionment of the New
Orleans councilmanic districts. The New Orleans City Council was
composed of seven members, two elected at-large and five elected
from councilmanic districts. New Orleans had reapportioned these
districts through a city ordinance.
"The ordinance ... made no
reference to the at-large councilmanic seats.
Indeed, since
those seats had been established ... by the city charter, an ordinance could not have altered them; any change in the charter
would have required approval by the city's voters." Id., at 138139. Furthermore, the ordinance did not affect the at-large
councilmen in any other way.
It did not change their titles.
It
did not increase or decrease the size of the city council.
In
short, the ordinance affected only the district councilmen.
It
was only in these circumstances that "[t)he at-large seats
were not subject to review ... under §5." Id., at 139.

8.

Lockhart was not entitled, under Texas law, to use a numberedpost system.

The court, distinguishing Perkins v. Matthews, 400

U.S. 379, 394 (1971), reasoned that recognition of the actual
practice rather than the legal requirement would reward the City
for its past illegality.

It preferred instead to draw its com-

parison in a way that would maximize the reach of §5.
Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 6 but that
is essentially irrelevant.

The proper comparison is between the

new system and the system actually in effect on November 1,
1972, 7 regardless of what state law might have required.

This

basis of comparison was established in Perkins v. Matthews,
supra.

There a city conducted the relevant election for aldermen

by wards, despite a state statute requiring at-large elections.
As the Perkins Court explained:
"In our view, §5's reference to the procedure 'in force
or effect on November 1, 19[72] ,'must be taken to mean
the procedure that would have been followed if the
election had been held on that date." Id., at 394.
This conclusion was based on the plain reading of the section's
language.
policy.

It is, moreover, in accord with the Act's underlying
Section 5 was intended to halt actual retrogression in

6 There does not appear to be any Texas case-law on the subject.
Lockhart had used its numbered post system for over fifty years
without challenge, suggesting a presumption of regularity under
state law.
?since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we consider
the system that would have been in effect if there had been an
election then. That, presumably, is the system that was used
without exception between 1917 and 1973. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 394-395 (1971).

9.

minority voting strength without regard for the legality under
state law of the practices already in effect. 8

B

We now consider whether the aspects of the new system to
which the Attorney General objected, when compared to the practices in use in Lockhart prior to the new charter, have the effeet of denying or abridging the right to vote guaranteed by §5.
Our inquiry is guided by the principles of Beer v. United States,
425

u.s.

130 (1976) . 9
Beer involved the reapportionment of the New Orleans

councilmanic districts.

Prior to the reapportionment, black cit-

izens had a majority of the population in only one of the five
districts and a majority of the registered voters in none.

Under

the new plan, blacks had a population majority in two districts
and a voter majority in one.

Although the new plan may have re-

mained discriminatory, it nevertheless was not a regressive

8 we also believe that the Attorney General and the District
Court for the District of Columbia should be free to decide
preclearance questions on the essentially factual issues of discriminatory purpose and effect. We doubt that Congress intended
to force either into speculation as to state law.
9 cano argues on appeal that the recent amendment to §2 of the
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973, see Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982), altered
the Beer standard. The District Court did not pass on this argument, and we decline to review it in the first instance. This
issue remains open on remand, both as to whether the amendment to
§2 is relevant to the adjudication of a §5 issue and, if so,
whether the amendment in any significant way altered the Beer
standard.

J.U.

change.

The Court accordingly held that the plan was entitled to

§5 preclearance.

As we explained, "[t)he language of §5 clearly

provides that it applies only to proposed changes in voting procedures."

425

u.s.,

at 138.

"[T)he purpose of §5 has always

been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made
that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise."

Id., at 141.

Since the new plan did not increase

the degree of discrimination against blacks, §5's requirements
were satisfied.
We apply these principles to the two aspects of the new
system that remain at issue in this case: the numbered-post system and staggered terms for councilmen. 10

It is recognized that

a numbered-post system may have the effect of discriminating
against minorities in a city where racial block voting predominates.

Use of numbered posts may frustrate the use of "single-

shot voting," a technique that permits concentrating of support
behind a single candidate.

It also is argued that numbered

post~

tend to highlight the individual, head-to-head races, to the detriment of minority candidates.

Lockhart used numbered posts,

however, before the 1973 charter.

Single-shot voting may be im-

possible now, but it was equally impossible under the old system.
The new system may highlight individual races, but so did the

lOThe Attorney General also objected to the use of at-large
elections, but the District Court did not hold, and the parties
before us do not argue, that the continued existence of at-large
elections has a retrogressive effect.

~

11.

old.

In short, minorities are in no worse a position now than

they were before the 1973 charter.

Applying the principles of

Beer, we conclude that the District Court erred in finding that
the continued use of numbered posts has a retrogressive effect on
minority voting strength.
The use of staggered terms also may have a discriminatory effect under some circumstances, since it, too, might reduce
the opportunity for single-shot voting or tend to highlight individual races.

But the introduction of staggered terms has not

diminished the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities.

Under

the old system, the voters faced two at-large elections with numbered posts every two years.

Now they face two at-large elec-

tions with numbered posts every year.
single-shot voting is identical.
individual races is identical.

The inability to use

The degree of highlighting of
Minorities are in the same posi-

tion every year that they used to be in every other year.

Al-

though there may have been no improvement in their voting
strength, there has been no retrogression, either.
Cano argues that the increased frequency of elections
made necessary by staggered terms has resulted in retrogression.
The more frequent elections are said to reduce voter turn-out,
and this has a disproportionate impact on minority voters.

In

support of this argument, he cites figures f r om the April 1975
election.

That year, when voter turn-out was unusually low, only

5.7% of the voters were Mexican-Americans.

In other years since

1973, the percentage of Mexican-American voters has been three to
six times as great.

These figures, however, are misleading.

In

12.

the April 1975 election, both council candidates were running
unopposed, and neither candidate was Mexican-American.

This un-

doubtedly explains both the lower overall turn-out and the lower
turn-out among Mexican-Americans.

For other elections since

1973, the overall turn-out and the Mexican-American turn-out has
been consistently higher than it was before the new charter, despite the fact that the population has increased only slightly.
In 1978, a Mexican-American candidate was elected in Lockhart for
the first time in its history, after five years of annual elections.

The record,

therefor~,

contradicts Cano's argument.

The

District Court erred in finding that the introduction of staggered terms had a retrogressive effect on minority voting
strength.

IV
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States, we conclude that the election changes introduced by the 1973 Lockhart
City Charter will not have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group.

The District Court's findings to the con-

trary were clearly erroneous.

We accordingly vacate the District

Court's judgment, and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-802
CITY OF LOCKHART, APPELLANT v. UNITED
STATES AND ALFRED CANO
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[December - , 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Cou
..---~~--T.fte:il'sau..t'n this case ia the application of § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act to lte election plan adopted by appellant City of
Lockhart in 1973.
I
The City of Lockhart is a community of just under 8,000
; "
people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south of Austin. According to the most recent census figures, almost
47% of the City's population are Mexican-American. As of
1977, however, fewer than 30% of the City's registered voters were Mexican-American.
Before 1973, Lockhart was a "general law" city. Under
Texas law, general-law cities have only those powers that the
State specifically permits them to possess. As authorized by
State law, Lockhart was governed by a commission consisting of a mayor and two commissioners, all serving the same
two-year terms. These offices were filled in April of evennumbered years through at-large elections using a "numbered post" system. Under this system, the two commissioner posts were designated by number, and each candidatt£: OL~ ( t :J30 Z9.
for commissioner specified the post for which he or she
,
•
..- nd
sought election. Thus each race was effectively a separate
1
1I
1
f
t
ffi
Li.
·I
'
.
I
t
e ec 1on or a separa e o ce.
·s·! \ 'lHIIO:J J W3~dnS
.J

,,e

' This numberedApost system may be contrasted with a system in which

0'3t.l3:!3l:l
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In 1973, Lockhart adopted a new charte and became a
"home rule" city. In contrast to a general-law city, a homerule city has authority to do whatever is not specifically prohibited by the State. This includes discretion to define the
form of city government and to establish the procedures for
city elections. As part of its new charter, Lockhart chose to
be governed by a city council consisting of a mayor and four
councilmen serving staggered two-year terms. The mayor
and two of the councilmen are elected in April of even-numbered years through at-large elections using the numberedpost system. The other two councilmen are similarly elected
in odd-numbered years.
Under§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, 2 covered jurisdictions may enall of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in a single election,
and the two receiving the greatest number of votes are elected.
u 2 Section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
[W]henever a State or political subdivision [such as Lockhart] shall enact
or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that
in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
~...L--------"'olor, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2)
1973b(f)(2) (prohibiting discrimination against members of language miority groups)], and unless and until the court enters such judgment no
person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with such
qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided,
That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may
be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, vrocedure has been submitted by the chief legal officer or
other approprfate official of such State or subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty
days after such submission . . . .
Neither an affirmative indication by
the Attorney General that no objection will be made, nor the Attorney
General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment entered under this

'\1
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force
changes in their election laws only after obtaining "preclearance" in one of two ways: (i) they may obtain a
declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia that the changes do not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a
language minority group, or (ii) they may submit the changes
to the Attorne General, who then has sixty days in which to
object. The Act
was extended to the State of
Texas in 1975, covering changes in election procedure from
those in effect on November 1, 1972. See 40 Fed. Reg.
43746 (1975).
In 1977, four Mexican-Americans, including appellee Alfred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of Lockhart's election procedures under th~..)973 charter. Cano v. Kirksey,
No. A-77-CA-133 (W}D/ Tex., dismissed Oct. 8, 1982), appeal pending sub nom. Cano v. Chess r, o. 82-161
,
filed Nov. 8, 1982). In the course oft at suit, the plaintiffs
discovered that Lockhart had never obtained approval under
§ 5 for the changes instituted in 1973. A second suit then
was brou ht to enjoin the City from using the new election
procedures pending ibe nqairm;l apJISII!Iii:Zl. The United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas
granted injunctive relief. 3
Cano v. Chess r, No.
section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure. . . . Any action
under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges
in accordance with the provisi.~ of [28 U. S. C. § 2284] and any appeal
shall lie to the Supreme CourtV
3
In granting the injunction, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
pass on the discriminatory purpose or effect of the changes.__;;A~ll~itS!c~o~lww...--,
was etermine ) whether a change was covered by § 5, ( if the change
was covered, wliether § 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and r
( ;---e
e,
j
the requirements were not satisfied, what remedy was appropriate.
e. g., United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429 U. S.
642, 645-{)47 (1977) (per curiam). Lockhart did not appeal the District

j;
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A-79--CA-0032 (w!D/Tex., Mar. 2, 1979) (three-judge
court).
Once future elections were enjoined pending § 5 approval,
Lockhart sought preclearance. The Attorney General, however, interposed an objection to the election procedures under the 1973 charter to the extent that they incorporate atlarge elections, the numbered-post system, and staggered terms for councilmen. Lockhart then filed the present suit
for a declaratory judgment in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Cano intervened as a defendant. As required by § 5, a three-judge court was convened to decide the case.
The District Court, recognizing that the City must prove
both the absence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory
purpose, bifurcated the trial. Addressing only the first issue, it held, over the dissent of Chief Judge Spottswood Robinson, of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, that Lockhart's election procedures
have the effect of discriminating against protected minorities. 4 The court first decided that the entire election plan
was subject to § 5's requirements. It then compared Lockhart's current system to that used before the 1973 charter,
except that the court refused to recognize the City's prior use
of numbered posts. This was justified on the ground that
the use of numbered posts was not explicitly authorized by
Texas law, and thus was illegal for a general-law city. The
~----....~o.:~
rt concluded that numbered posts and staggered terms
each
a discriminatory impact, particularly in view of the
history of racial block voting in Lockhart.
Chief Judge R obin~n , in dissent, agreed with the majority
that Lockhart's cityjfouncil election procedures were subject
to § 5 preclearance, and that the use of numbered posts and
Court's finding that the 1973 charter included changes that are covered by
§5.
' In view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it was unnecessary for
the District Court to reach the issue of discriminatory purpose.
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staggered terms tended to curb the ability of minorities to
elect minority candidates. But relying on Beer v. United
States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), he concluded that there was no
retrogression in minority voting strength.
The City appealed the judgment to this Court, contending
that the District Court misconstrued the scope of § 5, and
that, in any event, there has been no retrogression in minority voting strength. The United States, which defended the
suit below, now agrees with Lockhart that the changes have
no retrogressive effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Americans. Cano continues to defend the result below. We
noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1982). We
now vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

all oF

II
co().~ ci I
We consider first the scope of§ 5's coverage in th~ urnt111&
to
stances of this case. Lockhart concedes that § 5 p1)lies to its
lA. ~.e oF
electoral changes, and that the addition of~ o seats to its
nu rYI bl'rc J
governing body and the introduction of tlggered terms are
covered changes. It contends, how er, that § 5 does not
rl~te-s.,
apply to the "continuation" of the o old seats and the con.__.,...muea use of numbere~
e conclude that there has
been a change with respect to~-=tiiMIIil1ill_lliMI.,-flt:ifi-Mit1Ji6:..__ _

By introducing a new system of government, Lockhart has
changed the nature of the seats at issue. Council posts one
and two are not identical to the old commission posts one and
two. For example, they now constitute only 40% of the
council, rather than 67% of the commission. Moreover, one
cannot view these seats in isolation, for they are an integral
part of the council. The possible discriminatory purpose or
effect of the new seats, admittedly subject to § 5, cannot be
determined in isolation from the "preexisting" elements of
t e council. 6 We therefore hold that the entire system introduced in he 1973 charter is subject to preclearance.
6

Lockhart seeks to rely on Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976),
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III
Having decided that Lockhart's entire 1973 lection ~~~~s ___p
subject to § 5, we now determine whether the changes ~ ""• ttte zlly 'iha ,1111 that have not been precleared by the Attorney General have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a
language. minority group.
A
The first step is to identify the appropriate comparison.
The District Court compared the new plan to what the old
practice would have been without numbered posts. It justified this comparison on the ground
a
·
such as Lockhart was not entitle under Texas la"b.::..:to::-u=s:o.:e._a=-----~--numbered-post system. The court, distinguishin Perkins
~
v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379
1971), reasoned that recog~
nition of the actual practice rather than the legal requirement
would reward the City for its past illegality. It preferred instead to draw its comparison in a way that would maximize
the reach of § 5.
Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 6 but that is
but that decision is readily distinguishable on this point. In Beer, we considered the reapportionment of the New Orleans councilmanic districts.
The New Orleans City Council was composed of seven members two
·
1stricts. New Orleans
elected at-large and five elected from
had reapportioned these districts through a city ordinance. "The ordinance ... made no reference to the at-large councilmanic seats. Indeed,
since those seats had been established ... by the city charter, an ordinance could not have altered them; any change in the charter would have
required approval by the city's voters." Id., at 138-139. Furthermore,
the ordinance did not affect the at-large councilmen in any other way. It
did not change their titles. It did not increase or decrease the size of the
city council. In short, the ordinance affected only the district councilmen.
It was only in these circumstances that "[t]he at-large sea~t~s..:..
· :...·..:.·]W~~~--
subject to review ... under§ 5." Id., at 139. - - - - 6There does not appear to be any Texas cas aw on the subject. Lockhart had used Its numbere~ost system for over fift ears without challenge, suggesting a presumption of row
"ty under state aw.
1
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essentially irrelevant. The proper comparison is between
the new system and the system actually in effect on N ovember 1, 1972, 7 regardless of what state law might have required. This basis of comparison was established in Perkins
v. Matthews, supra. There a city conducted the relevant
election for aldermen by wards, despite a state statute requiring at-large elections. As the Perkins Court e::.:x!:.pl:.:.ru:=.;·n~e;..;;;d-.:_ _ _
"In our view, § 5's reference to the procedur n force or
effect on November 1, 19[72],' must be taken to mean the
procedure that would have been followed if the election
had been held on that date." .... , at 394.

-1.,
qoo u. s ..

This conclusion was based on the plain reading of the section's language. It is, moreover, in accord with the Act's underlying policy. Section 5 was intended to halt actual retrogression in minority voting strength without regard for the
legality under state law of the practices already in effect. 8
B
We now consider whether the aspects of the new system to
which the Attorney General objected, when compared to the
practices in use in Lockhart prior to the new charter, have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote guaranteed by § 5. Our inquiry is guided by the principles of Beer
v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). 9
7

Since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we consider the
system that would have been in effect if there had been an election then.
That, presumably, is the system that was used without exception between
1917 and 1973. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 39_4-395 (1971).
8
We also believe that the Attorney General and he District Court for
the District of Columbia should be free to decide preclearance questions on
the essentially factual issues of discri 'natory purpose and effect. We

-----n::~.: ;:;:~:-: ~-.~:,;;;~';:~:~;, ~;,:;;;~;.~;,:~;!;;~::;;~;
(1982~:::.
1982, Pub. .
. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131
The District ourt did not pass on this argument, and we decline to review

COfljfl'5~

al+eretl

-

t'he

Beer -5.faruJarJ.
wih!
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Beer involved the reapportionment of the New Orleans
councilmanic districts. Prior to the reapportionment, black
citizens had a majority of the population in only one of the
five districts and a majority of the registered voters in none.
Under the new plan, blacks had a population majority in two
districts and a voter majority in one. Although the new plan
may have remained discriminatory, it nevertheless was not a
regressive change. The Court.--~·~~=~~~~~~==--=
~. .ii!IIIII!Mt!~~~m~.w.--llii!!IIIEi!DiiD& explained "[t]he
language of § 5 clearly provides that it applies only to proposed changes in voting procedures." 425 U. S., at 138.
it w.et$
"[T]he purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no votentd-led
ing-procedure changes would be made that wo!!ld-Jead t<J a
1-6 ~ ~
retrogression in the position of racial Il}inorities with respect
to their effective exercise of the lectoral franchise." Id., at
141. Since the new plan di ot increase the degree of discrimination against blacks, . . . . . . . . .IIJIII!!Mia•-.~Mw.ie8'--""We apply these princip es to the two aspects of the new
system that remain at issue in this case: the numbered-post
system and staggered terms for councilmen. 10 It is recognized that a numbered-post system may have the effect of
discriminating against minorities in a city where racial block
voting predominates. Use of numbered posts may frustrate
c;;;~:-----'t;.;;h;;.::e;...;u:;.;s:..;;e:.,.;o:.:f:_"single-shot voting," a technique that permits concentrating
upport behind a single candidate. It also is argued that numbered posts tend to highlight the individual,
head-to-head races, to the detriment of minority candidates.
Lockhart used numbered posts, however, before the 1973
charter. Single-shot voting may be impossible now, but it
it in the first instance. This issue remains open on remand, both as to
whether the amendment to § 2 is relevant to the adjudication of a § 5 issue
and, if so, whether the amendment in any significant way altered the Beer
standard.
10
The Attorney General also objected to the use of at-large elections, but
the District Court did not hold, and the parties before us do not argue, that
the continued existence of at-large elections has a retrogressive effect.
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was equally impossible under the old system. The new
system may highlight individual races, but so did the old. In
short, minorities are in no worse a position now than they
were before the 1973 charter.
·
1lie District Court erred in finding
.
that the continued use oFnumbered posts has a retrogressive
effect on minority voting strength.
The use of staggered terms also may have a discriminatory
effect under some circumstances, since it, too, might reduce
the opportunity for single-shot voting or tend to highlight individual races. But the introduction of staggered terms has
not diminished the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities.
Under the old system, the voters faced two at-large elections
with numbered posts every two years. Now they face two
at-large elections with numbered posts every year. The inability to use single-shot voting is identical. The degree of
highlighting of individual races is identical. Minorities are in
the same position every year that they used to be in every
other year. Although there may have been no improvement
in their voting strength, there has been no retrogression,
either.
Cano argues that the increased frequency of elections made
necessary by staggered terms has resulted in retrogression.
The more frequent elections are said to reduce voter turnout, and this has a disproportionate impact on minority voters. In support of this argument, he cites figures from the
April1975 election. That year, when voter turn-out was unusually low, only 5. 7% of the voters were Mexican-Americans. In other years since 1973, the percentage of MexicanAmerican voters has been three to six times as great. These
figures, however, are misleading. In the April 1975 election, both council candidates were running unopposed, and
neither candidate was Mexican-American. This undoubtedly explains both the lower overall turn-out and the lower
turn-out among Mexican-Americans. For other elections
since 1973, the overall turn-out and the Mexican-American
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..--:----

turn-out
consistently higher than · ·
before the
new charter, despite the fact that the population
increased only slightly. In 1978, a Mexican-American candidate was elected in Lockhart for the first time in its history,
after five years of annual elections. The record, therefore,
contradicts Cano's argument. The District Court
·
finding that the introduction of staggered terms
gressive effect on minority voting strength.

IV
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States, we conclude that the election changes introduced by the 1973 Lockhart City Charter will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. The District Court's
findings to the contrary were clearly erroneous. We accordingly vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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2nd CHAMBERS DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81--802

CITY OF LOCKHART, APPELLANT v. UNITED
STATES AND ALFRED CANO
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[December - , 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to consider the application of § 5 of
the Voting Rights Act to the election plan adopted by appellant City of Lockhart in 1973.
I
The City of Lockhart is a community of just under 8,000
people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south of Austin. According to the most recent census figures, almost
47% of the City's population are Mexican-American. As of
1977, however, fewer than 30% of the City's registered voters were Mexican-American.
Before 1973, Lockhart was a "general law" city. Under
Texas law, general-law cities have only those powers that the
State specifically permits them to possess. As authorized by
State law, Lockhart was governed by a commission consisting of a mayor and two commissioners, all serving the same
two-year terms. These offices were filled in April of evennumbered years through at-large elections using a "numbered post" system. Under this system, the two commis. sioner posts were designated by number, and each candidate
for commissioner specified the post for which he or she
sought election. Thus each race was effectively a separate
election for a separate office. 1
1

This numbered-post system may be contrasted with a system in which
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In 1973, Lockhart adopted a new charter and became a
"home rule" city. In contrast to a general-law city, a homerule city has authority to do whatever is not specifically prohibited by the State. This includes discretion to define the
form of city government and to establish the procedures for
city elections. As part of its new charter, Lockhart chose to
be governed by a city council consisting of a mayor and four
councilmen serving staggered two-year terms. The mayor
and two of the councilmen are elected in April of even-numbered years through at-large elections using the numberedpost system. The other two councilmen are similarly elected
in odd-numbered years.
Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c/ covered jurisdictions may enall of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in a single election,
and the two receiving the greatest number of votes are elected.
' Section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"[W]henever a State or political subdivision [such as Lockhart] shall enact
or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that
in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) [42
U. S. C. § 1973b(f)(2) (prohibiting discrimination against members of language minority groups)], and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with
such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief
legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the
Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an
objection within sixty days after such submission. . . .
Neither an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made,
nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment
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force changes in their election laws only after obtaining
"preclearance" in one of two ways: (i) they may obtain a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia that the changes do not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a
language minority group, or (ii) they may submit the changes
to the Attorney General, who then has sixty days in which to
object. The Act was extended to the State of Texas in 1975,
covering changes in election procedure from those in effect on
November 1, 1972. See 40 Fed. Reg. 43746 (1975).
In 1977, four Mexican-Americans, including appellee Alfred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of Lockhart's election procedures under the 1973 charter. Cano v. Kirksey,
No. A-77-CA-133 (WD Tex., dismissed Oct. 8, 1982), appeal
pending sub nom. Cano v. Chesser, No. 82-1616 (CA5, filed
Nov. 8, 1982). In the course of that suit, the plaintiffs discovered that Lockhart had never obtained approval under § 5
for the changes instituted in 1973. A second suit then was
brought to enjoin the City from using the new election procedures pending § 5 preclearance. The United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas granted injunctive
relief. 3 Cano v. Chesser, No. A-79-CA-0032 (WD Tex.,
Mar. 2, 1979) (three-judge court).
entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure.
. . . Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a
court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of [28 U. S. C.
§ 2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court."
3
In granting the injunction, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
pass on the discriminatory purpose or effect of the changes. All it could do
was determine (i) whether a change was covered by § 5, (ii) if the change
was covered, whether § 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and (iii)
if the requirements were not satisfied, what remedy was appropriate.
See, e. g., United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429
U. S. 642, 645-647 (1977) (per curiam). Lockhart did not appeal the Dis-
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Once future elections were enjoined pending § 5 approval,
Lockhart sought preclearance. The Attorney General, however, interposed an objection to the election procedures under the 1973 charter to the extent that they incorporate atlarge elections, the numbered-post system, and staggered
terms for councilmen. Lockhart then filed the present suit
for a declaratory judgment in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Cano intervened as a defendant. As required by § 5, a three-judge court was convened to decide the case.
The District Court, recognizing that the City must prove
both the absence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory
purpose, bifurcated the trial. Addressing only the first issue, it held, over the dissent of Chief Judge Spottswood Robinson, of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, that Lockhart's election procedures
have the effect of discriminating against protected minorities. 4 The court first decided that the entire election plan
was subject to § 5's requirements. It then compared Lockhart's current system to that used before the 1973 charter,
except that the court refused to recognize the City's prior use
of numbered posts. This was justified on the ground that
the use of numbered posts was not explicitly authorized by
Texas law, and thus was illegal for a general-law city. The
court concluded that numbered posts and staggered terms
each have a discriminatory impact, particularly in view of the
history of racial block voting in Lockhart.
Chief Judge Robinson, in dissent, agreed with the majority
that Lockhart's city-council election procedures were subject
to § 5 preclearance, and that the use of numbered posts and
staggered terms tended to curb the ability of minorities to
trict Court's finding that the 1973 charter included changes that are covered by §5.
• In view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it was unnecessary for
the District Court to reach the issue of discriminatory purpose.
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elect minority candidates. But relying on Beer v. United
States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), he concluded that there was no
retrogression in minority voting strength.
The City appealed the judgment to this Court, contending
that the District Court misconstrued the scope of § 5, and
that, in any event, there has been no retrogression in minority voting strength. The United States, which defended the
suit below, now agrees with Lockhart that the changes have
no retrogressive effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Americans. Cano continues to defend the result below. We
noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1982). We
now vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
II
We consider first the scope of§ 5's coverage in the circumstances of this case. Lockhart concedes that § 5 applies to its
electoral changes, and that the addition of two seats to its
governing body and the introduction of staggered terms are
covered changes. It contends, however, that § 5 does not
apply to the "continuation" of the two old seats and the continued use of numbered posts. We conclude that there has
been a change with respect to all of the council seats and to
the use of numbered places.
By introducing a new system of government, Lockhart has
changed the nature of the seats at issue. Council posts one
and two are not identical to the old commission posts one and
two. For example, they now constitute only 40% of the
council, rather than 67% of the commission. Moreover, one
cannot view these seats in isolation, for they are an integral
part of the council. The possible discriminatory purpose or
effect of the new seats, admittedly subject to § 5, cannot be
determined in isolation from the "preexisting" elements of
the council. Similarly, the numbered-post system is an integral part of the new election plan. The impact of any of the
seats cannot be evaluated without considering the fact that
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they are all filled in elections using numbered posts. 5 We
therefore hold that the entire system introduced in the 1973
charter is subject to preclearance.

III
Having decided that Lockhart's entire 1973 election plan is
subject to § 5, we now determine whether the plan's changes
that have not been precleared by the Attorney General have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race, color, or membership in a language minority group.
A
The first step is to identify the appropriate comparison.
The District Court compared the new plan to what the old
practice would have been without numbered posts. It justified this comparison on the ground that a general-law city
such as Lockhart was not entitled under Texas law to use a
numbered-post system. The court, distinguishing Perkins
v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), reasoned that recognition
of the actual practice rather than the legal requirement
would reward the City for its past illegality. It preferred instead to draw its comparison in a way that would maximize
the reach of § 5.
• Lockhart seeks to rely on Beer v. United States , 425 U. S. 130 (1976),
but that decision is readily distinguishable on this point. In Beer, we considered the reapportionment of the New Orleans councilmanic districts.
The New Orleans City Council was composed of seven members, two
elected at-large and five elected from districts. New Orleans had reapportioned these districts through a city ordinance. "The ordinance .. . made
no reference to the at-large councilmanic seats. Indeed, since those seats
had been established ... by the city charter, an ordinance could not have
altered them; any change in the charter would have required approval by
the city's voters." Id., at 138-139. Furthermore, the ordinance did not
affect the at-large councilmen in any other way. It did not change their
titles. It did not increase or decrease the size of the city council. In
short, the ordinance affected only the district councilmen. It was only in
these circumstances that "[t]he at-large seats .. . were not subject to review ... under§ 5." I d., at 139.
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Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 6 but that is
essentially irrelevant. The proper comparison is between
the new system and the system actually in effect on November 1, 1972, 7 regardless of what state law might have required. This basis of comparison was established in Perkins
v. Matthews, supra. There a city conducted the relevant
election for aldermen by wards, despite a state statute requiring at-large elections. As the Perkins Court explained:
"In our view, § 5's reference to the procedure 'in force or
effect on November 1, 19[72],' must be taken to mean the
procedure that would have been followed if the election
had been held on that date." 400 U. S., at 394.
This conclusion was based on the plain reading of the section's language. It is, moreover, in accord with the Act's underlying policy. Section 5 was intended to halt actual retrogression in minority voting strength without regard for the
legality under state law of the practices already in effect. 8
B
We now consider whether the aspects of the new system to
which the Attorney General objected, when compared to the
practices in use in Lockhart prior to the new charter, have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote guaranteed by § 5. Our inquiry is guided by the principles of Beer
v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). 9
6
There does not appear to be any Texas case law on the subject. Lockhart had used its numbered-post system for over fifty years without challenge, suggesting a presumption of legality under state law.
7
Since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we consider the system that would have been in effect if there had been an election then.
That, presumably, is the system that was used without exception between
1917 and 1973. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 394-395 (1971).
8
We also believe that the Attorney General and the District Court for
the District of Columbia should be free to decide preclearance questions on
the essentially factual issues of discriminatory purpose and effect. We
doubt that Congress intended to force either into speculation as to state
law.
9
Cano argues on appeal that Congress altered the Beer standard with
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Beer involved the reapportionment of the New Orleans
councilmanic districts. Prior to the reapportionment, black
citizens had a majority of the population in only one of the
five districts and a majority of the registered voters in none.
Under the new plan, blacks had a population majority in two
districts and a voter majority in one. Although the new plan
may have remained discriminatory, it nevertheless was not a
regressive change. The Court explained that "[t]he language of § 5 clearly provides that it applies only to proposed
changes in voting procedures." 425 U. 8., at 138. "[T]he
purpose of§ 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise." I d., at 141.
Since the new plan did not increase the degree of discrimination against blacks, it was entitled to § 5 preclearance.
We apply these principles to the two aspects of the new
system that remain at issue in this case: the numbered-post
system and staggered terms for councilmen. 10 It is recognized that a numbered-post system may have the effect of
discriminating against minorities in a city where racial block
voting predominates. Use of numbered posts may frustrate
the use of "single-shot voting," a technique that permits concentrating support behind a single candidate. It also is argued that numbered posts tend to highlight the individual,
head-to-head races, to the detriment of minority candidates.
the recent amendment to § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 437, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, see Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,
Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982). The District Court did not pass on
this argument, and we decline to review it in the first instance. This issue
remains open on remand, both as to whether the amendment to § 2 is relevant to the adjudication of a § 5 issue and, if so, whether the amendment in
any significant way altered the Beer standard.
10
The Attorney General also objected to the use of at-large elections, but
the District Court did not hold, and the parties before us do not argue, that
the continued existence of at-large elections has a retrogressive effect.
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Lockhart used numbered posts, however, before the 1973
charter. Single-shot voting may be impossible now, but it
was equally impossible under the old system. The new system may highlight individual races, but so did the old. In
short, minorities are in no worse a position now than they
were before the 1973 charter. The District Court erred in
finding that the continued use of numbered posts has a retrogressive effect on minority voting strength.
The use of staggered terms also may have a discriminatory
effect under some circumstances, since it, too, might reduce
the opportunity for single-shot voting or tend to highlight individual races. But the introduction of staggered terms has
not diminished the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities.
Under the old system, the voters faced two at-large elections
with numbered posts every two years. Now they face two
at-large elections with numbered posts every year. The inability to use single-shot voting is identical. The degree of
highlighting of individual races is identical. Minorities are in
the same position every year that they used to be in every
other year. Although there may have been no improvement
in their voting strength, there has been no retrogression,
either.
Cano argues that the increased frequency of elections made
necessary by staggered terms has resulted in retrogression.
The more frequent elections are said to reduce voter turnout, and this has a disproportionate impact on minority voters. In support of this argument, he cites figures from the
April1975 election. That year, when voter turn-out was unusually low, only 5. 7% of the voters were Mexican-Americans. In other years since 1973, the percentage of MexicanAmerican voters has been three to six times as great. These
figures, however, are misleading. In the April 1975 election, both council candidates were running unopposed, and
neither candidate was Mexican-American. This undoubtedly explains both the lower overall turn-out and the lower
turn-out among Mexican-Americans. For other elections

81-802-0PINION
10

LOCKHART v. UNITED STATES

since 1973, the overall turn-out and the Mexican-American
turn-out were consistently higher than they were before the
new charter, despite the fact that the population increased
only slightly. In 1978, a Mexican-American candidate was
elected in Lockhart for the first time in its history, after five
years of annual elections. The record, therefore, contradicts
Cano's argument. The District Court erred in finding that
the introduction of staggered terms has had a retrogressive
effect on minority voting strength.

IV
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States, we conclude that the election changes introduced by the 1973 Lockhart City Charter will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. The District Court's
findings to the contrary were clearly erroneous. We accordingly vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-802

CITY OF LOCKHART, APPELLANT v. UNITED
STATES AND ALFRED CANO
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[December - , 1982]

JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to consider the application of § 5 of
the Voting Rights Act to the election plan adopted by appellant City of Lockhart in 1973.
I
The City of Lockhart is a community of just under 8,000
people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south of Austin. According to the most recent census figures, almost
47% of the City's population are Mexican-American. As of
1977, however, fewer than 30% of the City's registered voters were Mexican-American.
Before 1973, Lockhart was a "general law" city. Under
Texas law, general-law cities have only those powers that the
State specifically permits them to possess. As authorized by
State law, Lockhart was governed by a commission consisting of a mayor and two commissioners, all serving the same
two-year terms. These offices were filled in April of evennumbered years through at-large elections using a "numbered post" system. Under this system, the two commissioner posts were designated by number, and each candidate
for commissioner specified the post for which he or she
sought election. Thus each race was effectively a separate
election for a separate office. 1
1

This numbered-post system may be contrasted with a system in which
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In 1973, Lockhart adopted a new charter and became a
"home rule" city. In contrast to a general-law city, a homerule city has authority to do whatever is not specifically prohibited by the State. This includes discretion to define the
form of city government and to establish the procedures for
city elections. As part of its new charter, Lockhart chose to
be governed by a city council consisting of a mayor and four
councilmen serving staggered two-year terms. The mayor
and two of the councilmen are elected in April of even-numbered years through at-large elections using the numberedpost system. The other two councilmen are similarly elected
in odd-numbered years.
Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, 2 covered jurisdictions may enall of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in a single election,
and the two receiving the greatest number of votes are elected.
2
Section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"[W]henever a State or political subdivision [such as Lockhart] shall enact
or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that
in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) [42
U. S. C. § 1973b(f)(2) (prohibiting discrimination against members of language minority groups)], and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with
such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief
legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the
Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an
Neither an affirobjection within sixty days after such submission. . . .
mative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made,
nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment
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force changes in their election laws only after obtaining
"preclearance" in one of two ways: (i) they may obtain a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia that the changes do not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a
language minority group, or (ii) they may submit the changes
to the Attorney General, who then has sixty days in which to
object. The Act was extended to the State of Texas in 1975,
covering changes in election procedure from those in effect on
November 1, 1972. See 40 Fed. Reg. 43746 (1975).
In 1977, four Mexican-Americans, including appellee Alfred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of Lockhart's election procedures under the 1973 charter. Cano v. Kirksey,
No. A-77-CA-133 (WD Tex., dismissed Oct. 8, 1982), appeal
pending sub nom. Cano v. Chesser, No. 82-1616 (CA5, filed
Nov. 8, 1982). In the course of that suit, the plaintiffs discovered that Lockhart had never obtained approval under § 5
for the changes instituted in 1973. A second suit then was
brought to enjoin the City from using the new election procedures pending § 5 preclearance. The United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas granted injunctive
relief. 3 Cano v. Chesser, No. A-79-CA-0032 (WD Tex.,
Mar. 2, 1979) (three-judge court).
entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure.
. . . Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a
court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of [28 U. S. C.
§ 2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court."
8
In granting the injunction, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
pass on the discriminatory purpose or effect of the changes. All it could do
was determine (i) whether a change was covered by § 5, (ii) if the change
was covered, whether § 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and (iii)
if the requirements were not satisfied, what remedy was appropriate.
See, e. g., United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429
U. S. 642, 645-647 (1977) (per curiam). Lockhart did not appeal the Dis-
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Once future elections were enjoined pending § 5 approval,
Lockhart sought preclearance. The Attorney General, however, interposed an objection to the election procedures under the 1973 charter to the extent that they incorporate atlarge elections, the numbered-post system, and staggered
terms for councilmen. Lockhart then filed the present suit
for a declaratory judgment in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Cano intervened as a defendant. As required by § 5, a three-judge court was convened to decide the case.
The District Court, recognizing that the City must prove
both the absence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory
purpose, bifurcated the trial. Addressing only the first issue, it held, over the dissent of Chief Judge Spottswood Robinson, of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, that Lockhart's election procedures
have the effect of discriminating against protected minorities. 4 The court first decided that the entire election plan
was subject to § 5's requirements. It then compared Lockhart's current system to that used before the 1973 charter,
except that the court refused to recognize the City's prior use
of numbered posts. This was justified on the ground that
the use of numbered posts was not explicitly authorized by
Texas law, and thus was illegal for a general-law city. The
court concluded that numbered posts and staggered terms
each have a discriminatory impact, particularly in view of the
history of racial block voting in Lockhart.
Chief Judge Robinson, in dissent, agreed with the majority
that Lockhart's city-council election procedures were subject
to § 5 preclearance, and that the use of numbered posts and
staggered terms tended to curb the ability of minorities to
trict Court's finding that the 1973 charter included changes that are covered by§ 5.
4
In view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it was unnecessary for
the District Court to reach the issue of discriminatory purpose.
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elect minority candidates. But relying on Beer v. United
States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), he concluded that there was no
retrogression in minority voting strength.
The City appealed the judgment to this Court, contending
that the District Court misconstrued the scope of § 5, and
that, in any event, there has been no retrogression in minority voting strength. The United States, which defended the
suit below, now agrees with Lockhart that the changes have
no retrogressive effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Americans. Cano continues to defend the result below. We
noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1982). We
now vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
II
We consider first the scope of§ 5's coverage in the circumstances of this case. Lockhart concedes that § 5 applies to its
electoral changes, and that the addition of two seats to its
governing body and the introduction of staggered terms are
covered changes. It contends, however, that § 5 does not
apply to the "continuation" of the two old seats and the continued use of numbered posts. We conclude that there has
been a change with respect to all of the council seats and to
the use of numbered places.
By introducing a new system of government, Lockhart has
changed the nature of the seats at issue. Council posts one
and two are not identical to the old commission posts one and
two. For example, they now constitute only 40% of the
council, rather than 67% of the commission. Moreover, one
cannot view these seats in isolation, for they are an integral
part of the council. The possible discriminatory purpose or
effect of the new seats, admittedly subject to § 5, cannot be
determined in isolation from the "preexisting" elements of
the council. Similarly, the numbered-post system is an integral part of the new election plan. The impact of any of the
seats cannot be evaluated without considering the fact that
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they are all filled in elections using numbered posts. 5 We
therefore hold that the entire system introduced in the 1973
charter is subject to preclearance.

III
Having decided that Lockhart's entire 1973 election plan is
subject to § 5, we now determine whether the plan's changes
that have not been precleared by the Attorney General have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race, color, or membership in a language minority group.
A
The first step is to identify the appropriate comparison.
The District Court compared the new plan to what the old
practice would have been without numbered posts. It justified this comparison on the ground that a general-law city
such as Lockhart was not entitled under Texas law to use a
numbered-post system. The court, distinguishing Perkins
v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), reasoned that recognition
of the actual practice rather than the legal requirement
would reward the City for its past illegality. It preferred instead to draw its comparison in a way that would maximize
the reach of § 5.
5
Lockhart seeks to rely on Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976),
but that decision is readily distinguishable on this point. In Beer, we considered the reapportionment of the New Orleans councilmanic districts.
The New Orleans City Council was composed of seven members, two
elected at-large and five elected from districts. New Orleans had reapportioned these districts through a city ordinance. "The ordinance ... made
no reference to the at-large councilmanic seats. Indeed, since those seats
had been established ... by the city charter, an ordinance could not have
altered them; any change in the charter would have required approval by
the city's voters." Id., at 138-139. Furthermore, the ordinance did not
affect the at-large councilmen in any other way. It did not change their
titles. It did not increase or decrease the size of the city council. In
short, the ordinance affected only the district councilmen. It was only in
these circumstances that "(t]he at-large seats ... were not subject to review ... under§ 5." !d., at 139.
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Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 6 but that is
essentially irrelevant. The proper comparison is between
the new system and the system actually in effect on November 1, 1972, 7 regardless of what state law might have required. This basis of comparison was established in Perkins
v. Matthews, supra. There a city conducted the relevant
election for aldermen by wards, despite a state statute requiring at-large elections. As the Perkins Court explained:
"In our view, § 5's reference to the procedure 'in force or
effect on November 1, 19[72],' must be taken to mean the
procedure that would have been followed if the election
had been held on that date." 400 U. S., at 394.
This conclusion was based on the plain reading of the section's language. It is, moreover, in accord with the Act's underlying policy. Section 5 was intended to halt actual retrogression in minority voting strength without regard for the
legality under state law of the practices already in effect. 8
B

We now consider whether the aspects of the new system to
which the Attorney General objected, when compared to the
practices in use in Lockhart prior to the new charter, have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote guaranteed by § 5. Our inquiry is guided by the principles of Beer
v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). 9
6
There does not appear to be any Texas case law on the subject. Lockhart had used its numbered-post system for over fifty years without challenge, suggesting a presumption of legality under state law.
7
Since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we consider the system that would have been in effect if there had been an election then.
That, presumably, is the system that was used without exception between
1917 and 1973. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 394-395 (1971).
8
We also believe that the Attorney General and the District Court for
the District of Columbia should be free to decide preclearance questions on
the essentially factual issues of discriminatory purpose and effect. We
doubt that Congress intended to force either into speculation as to state
law.
9
Cano argues on appeal that Congress altered the Beer standard with
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Beer involved the reapportionment of the New Orleans
councilmanic districts. Prior to the reapportionment, black
citizens had a majority of the population in only one of the
five districts and a majority of the registered voters in none.
Under the new plan, blacks had a population majority in two
districts and a voter majority in one. Although the new plan
may have remained discriminatory, it nevertheless was not a
regressive change. The Court explained that "[t]he language of § 5 clearly provides that it applies only to proposed
changes in voting procedures." 425 U. S., at 138. "[T]he
purpose of§ 5 has always b~en to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise." I d., at 141.
Since the new plan did not increase the degree of discrimination against blacks, it was entitled to § 5 preclearance.
We apply these principles to the two aspects of the new
system that remain at issue in this case: the numbered-post
system and staggered terms for councilmen. 10 It is recognized that a numbered-post system, in some circumstances,
may have the effect of discriminating against minorities in a
city where racial block voting predominates. Use of numbered posts may frustrate the use of "single-shot voting," a
technique that permits concentrating support behind a single
candidate. Lockhart has used numbered posts, however,
consistently since 1917. Effective single-shot voting may be
impossible now, but it was equally impossible under the old
system. The new system may highlight individual races, but
so did the old. As Chief Judge Robinson concluded, "the
the recent amendment to § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 437, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, see Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,
Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982). The District Court did not pass on
this argument, and we decline to review it.
10
The Attorney General also objected to the use of at-large elections, but
the District Court did not hold, and the parties before us do not argue, that
the continued existence of at-large elections has a retrogressive effect.
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voting strength of Lockhart's minorities, whether or not enhanced, [has not been] diminished one whit." App. to Juris.
Statement 33a. The District Court erred in finding that the
continued use of numbered posts has a retrogressive effect on
minority voting strength.
The use of staggered terms also may have a discriminatory
effect under some circumstances, since it, too, might reduce
the opportunity for single-shot voting or tend to highlight individual ~aces. But the introduction of staggered terms has
not diminished the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities.
Under the old system, the voters faced two at-large elections
with numbered posts every two years. Now they face two
at-large elections with numbered posts every year. The inability to use single-shot voting is identical. The degree of
highlighting of individual races is identical. Minorities are in
the same position every year that they used to be in every
other year. Although there may have been no improvement
in their voting strength, there has been no retrogression,
either.
Cano argues that the increased frequency of elections made
necessary by staggered terms has resulted in retrogression.
The more frequent elections are said to reduce voter turnout, and this has a disproportionate impact on minority voters. In support of this argument, he cites figures from the
April1975 election. That year, when voter turn-out was unusually low, only 5. 7% of the voters were Mexican-Americans. In other years since 1973, the percentage of MexicanAmerican voters has been three to six times as great. These
figures, however, are misleading. In the April 1975 election, both council candidates were running unopposed, and
neither candidate was Mexican-American. This undoubtedly explains both the lower overall turn-out and the lower
turn-out among Mexican-Americans. For other elections
since 1973, the overall turn-out and the Mexican-American
turn-out were consistently higher than they were before the
new charter, despite the fact that the population increased
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only slightly. In 1978, a Mexican-American candidate was
elected in Lockhart for the first time in its history, after five
years of annual elections. The record, therefore, contradicts
Cano's argument. The District Court erred in finding that
the introduction of staggered terms has had a retrogressive
effect on minority voting strength.
IV
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States, we conclude that the election changes introduced by the 1973 Lockhart City Charter will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. The District Court's
findings to the contrary were clearly erroneous. We accordingly vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-802

CITY OF LOCKHART, APPELLANT v. UNITED
STATES AND ALFRED CANO
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[December -

, 1982]

JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to consider the application of § 5 of
the Voting Rights Act to the election plan adopted by appellant City of Lockhart in 1973.
I
The City of Lockhart is a community of just under 8,000
people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south of Austin. According to the most recent census figures, almost
47% of the City's population are Mexican-American. As of
1977, however, fewer than 30% of the City's registered voters were Mexican-American.
Before 1973, Lockhart was a "general law" city. Under
Texas law, general-law cities have only those powers that the
State specifically permits them to possess. As authorized by
State law, Lockhart was governed by a commission consisting of a mayor and two commissioners, all serving the same
two-year terms. These offices were filled in April of evennumbered years through at-large elections using a "numbered post" system. Under this system, the two commissioner posts were designated by number, and each candidate
for commissioner specified the post for which he or she
sought election. Thus each race was effectively a separate
election for a separate office. 1
1

This numbered-post system may be contrasted with a system in which
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In 1973, Lockhart adopted a new charter and became a
"home rule" city. In contrast to a general-law city, a homerule city has authority to do whatever is not specifically prohibited by the State. This includes discretion to define the
form of city government and to establish the procedures for
city elections. As part of its new charter, Lockhart chose to
be governed by a city council consisting of a mayor and four
councilmen serving staggered two-year terms. The mayor
and two of the councilmen are elected in April of even-numbered years through at-large elections using the numberedpost system. The other two councilmen are similarly elected
in odd-numbered years.
Under§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c/ covered jurisdictions may enall of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in a single election,
and the two receiving the greatest number of votes are elected.
2
Section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"[W]henever a State or political subdivision [such as Lockhart] shall enact
or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that
in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) [42
U. S. C. § 1973b(f)(2) (prohibiting discrimination against members of language minority groups)], and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with
such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief
legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the
Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an
objection within sixty days after such submission. . . .
Neither an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made,
nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment
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force changes in their election laws only after obtaining
"preclearance" in one of two ways: (i) they may obtain a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia that the changes do not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging
the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a
language minority group, or (ii) they may submit the changes
to the Attorney General, who then has sixty days in which to
object. The Act was extended to the State of Texas in 1975,
covering changes in election procedure from those in effect on
November 1, 1972. See 40 Fed. Reg. 43746 (1975).
In 1977, four Mexican-Americans, including appellee Alfred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of Lockhart's election procedures under the 1973 charter. Cano v. Kirksey,
No. A-77-CA-133 (WD Tex., dismissed Oct. 8, 1982), appeal
pending sub nom. Cano v. Chesser, No. 82-1616 (CA5, filed
Nov. 8, 1982). In the course of that suit, the plaintiffs discovered that Lockhart had never obtained approval under § 5
for the changes instituted in 1973. A second suit then was
brought to enjoin the City from using the new election procedures pending § 5 preclearance. The United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas granted injunctive
relief. 3 Cano v. Chesser, No. A-79-CA-0032 (WD Tex.,
Mar. 2, 1979) (three-judge court).
entered under this section shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure.
. . . Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a
court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of [28 U. S. C.
§ 2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court."
3
In granting the injunction, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
pass on the discriminatory purpose or effect of the changes. All it could do
was determine (i) whether a change was covered by § 5, (ii) if the change
was covered, whether § 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and (iii)
if the requirements were not satisfied, what remedy was appropriate.
See, e. g., United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429
U. S. 642, 645-647 (1977) (per curiam). Lockhart did not appeal the Dis-
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Once future elections were enjoined pending § 5 approval,
Lockhart sought preclearance. The Attorney General, however, interposed an objection to the election procedures under the 1973 charter to the extent that they incorporate atlarge elections, the numbered-post system, and staggered
terms for councilmen. Lockhart then filed the present suit
for a declaratory judgment in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Cano intervened as a defendant. As required by § 5, a three-judge court was convened to decide the case.
The District Court, recognizing that the City must prove
both the absence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory
purpose, bifurcated the trial. Addressing only the first issue, it held, over the dissent of Chief Judge Spottswood Robinson, of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, that Lockhart's election procedures
have the effect of discriminating against protected minorities. 4 The court first decided that the entire election plan
was subject to § 5's requirements. It then compared Lockhart's current system to that used before the 1973 charter,
except that the court refused to recognize the City's prior use
of numbered posts. This was justified on the ground that
the use of numbered posts was not explicitly authorized by
Texas law, and thus was illegal for a general-law city. The
court concluded that numbered posts and staggered terms
each have a discriminatory impact, particularly in view of the
history of racial bloc voting in Lockhart.
Chief Judge Robinson, in dissent, agreed with the majority
that Lockhart's city-council election procedures were subject
to § 5 preclearance, and that the use of numbered posts and
staggered terms tended to curb the ability of minorities to
trict Court's finding that the 1973 charter included changes that are covered by §5.
' In view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it was unnecessary for
the District Court to reach the issue of discriminatory purpose.

1
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elect minority candidates. But relying on Beer v. United
States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), he concluded that there was no
retrogression in minority voting strength.
The City appealed the judgment to this Court, contending
that the District Court misconstrued the scope of § 5, and
that, in any event, there has been no retrogression in minority voting strength. The United States, which defended the
suit below, now agrees with Lockhart that the changes have
no retrogressive effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Americans. Cano continues to defend the result below. We
noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1982). We
now vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
II
We consider first the scope of§ 5's coverage in the circumstances of this case. Lockhart concedes that § 5 applies to its
electoral changes, and that the addition of two seats to its
governing body and the introduction of staggered terms are
covered changes. It contends, however, that § 5 does not
apply to the "continuation" of the two old seats and the continued use of numbered posts. We conclude that there has
been a change with respect to all of the council seats and to
the use of numbered places.
In moving from a three-member commission to a five-member council, Lockhart has changed the nature of the seats at
issue. Council posts one and two are not identical to the old
commission posts one and two. For example, they now constitute only 40% of the council, rather than 67% of the commission. Moreover, one cannot view these seats in isolation,
for they are an integral part of the council. The possible discriminatory purpose or effect of the new seats, admittedly
subject to § 5, cannot be determined in isolation from the
"preexisting" elements of the council. Similarly, the numbered-post system is an integral part of the new election
plan. The impact of any of the seats cannot be evaluated

I
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without considering the fact that they are all filled in elections using numbered posts. 5 We therefore hold that the entire system introduced in the 1973 charter is subject to
preclearance.

III
Having decided that Lockhart's entire 1973 election plan is
subject to § 5, we now determine whether the plan's changes
that have not been precleared by the Attorney General have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race, color, or membership in a language minority group.
A
The first step is to identify the appropriate comparison.
The District Court compared the new plan to what the old
practice would have been without numbered posts. It justified this comparison on the ground that a general-law city
such as Lockhart was not entitled under Texas law to use a
numbered-post system. The court, distinguishing Perkins
v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), reasoned that recognition
of the actual practice rather than the legal requirement
would reward the City for its past illegality. It preferred in5
Lockhart seeks to rely on Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976),
but that decision is readily distinguishable on this point. In Beer, we considered the reapportionment of the New Orleans councilmanic districts.
The New Orleans City Council was composed of seven members, two
elected at-large and five elected from districts. New Orleans had reapportioned these districts through a city ordinance. "The ordinance ... made
no reference to the at-large councilmanic seats. Indeed, since those seats
had been established ... by the city charter, an ordinance could not have
altered them; any change in the charter would have required approval by
the city's voters." ld., at 138-139. Furthermore, the ordinance did not
affect the at-large councilmen in any other way. It did not change their
titles. It did not increase or decrease the size of the city council. In
short, the ordinance affected only the district councilmen. It was only in
these circumstances that "[t]he at-large seats ... were not subject to review ... under§ 5." !d., at 139.
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stead to draw its comparison in a way that would maximize
the reach of § 5.
Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 6 but that is
essentially irrelevant. The proper comparison is between
the new system and the system actually in effect on November 1, 1972, 7 regardless of what state law might have required. This basis of comparison was established in Perkins
v. Matthews, supra. There a city conducted the relevant
election for aldermen by wards, despite a state statute requiring at-large elections. As the Perkins Court explained:
"In our view, § 5's reference to the procedure 'in force or
effect on November 1, 19[72],' must be taken to mean the
procedure that would have been followed if the election
had been held on that date." 400 U. 8., at 394.
This conclusion was based on the plain reading of the section's language. It is, moreover, in accord with the Act's underlying policy. Section 5 was intended to halt actual retrogression in minority voting strength without regard for the
legality under state law of the practices already in effect. 8
B
We now consider whether the aspects of the new system to
which the Attorney General objected, when compared to the
practices in use in Lockhart prior to the new charter, have
6
There does not appear to be any Texas case law on the subject. Lockhart had used its numbered-post system for over fifty years without challenge, suggesting a presumption of legality under state law.
7
Since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we consider the system that would have been in effect if there had been an election then.
That, presumably, is the system that was used without exception between
1917 and 1973. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 394-395 (1971).
8
We also believe that the Attorney General and the District Court for
the District of Columbia should be free to decide preclearance questions on
the essentially factual issues of discriminatory purpose and effect. We
doubt that Congress intended to force either into speculation as to state
law.
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the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote guaranteed by § 5. Our inquiry is guided by the principles of Beer
v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). 9
Beer involved the reapportionment of the New Orleans
councilmanic districts. Prior to the reapportionment, black
citizens had a majority of the population in only one of the
five districts and a majority of the registered voters in none.
Under the new plan, blacks had a population majority in two
districts and a voter majority in one. Although the new plan
may have remained discriminatory, it nevertheless was not a
regressive change. The Court explained that "[t]he language of § 5 clearly provides that it applies only to proposed
changes in voting procedures." 425 U. S., at 138. "[T]he
purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise." I d., at 141.
Since the new plan did not increase the degree of discrimination against blacks, it was entitled to § 5 preclearance.
We apply these principles to the two aspects of the new
system that remain at issue in this case: the numbered-post
system and staggered terms for councilmen. 10 It is recognized that a numbered-post system, in some circumstances,
may have the effect of discriminating against minorities in a
city where racial bloc voting predominates. Use of numbered posts may frustrate the use of "single-shot voting," a
technique that permits concentrating support behind a single
candidate. Lockhart has used numbered posts, however,
9
Cano argues on appeal that Congress altered the Beer standard with
the recent amendment to § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 437, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, see Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,
Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982). The District Court did not pass on
this argument, and we decline to review it.
0
' The Attorney General also objected to the use of at-large elections, but
the District Court did not hold, and the parties before us do not argue, that
the continued existence of at-large elections has a retrogressive effect.

f
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consistently since 1917. Effective single-shot voting may be
impossible now, but it was equally impossible under the old
system. The new system may highlight individual races, but
so did the old. As Chief Judge Robinson concluded, "the
voting strength of Lockhart's minorities, whether or not enhanced, [has not been] diminished one whit." App. to Juris.
Statement 33a. The District Court erred in finding that the
continued use of numbered posts has a retrogressive effect on
minority voting strength.
The use of staggered terms also may have a discriminatory
effect under some circumstances, since it, too, might reduce
the opportunity for single-shot voting or tend to highlight individual races. But the introduction of staggered terms has
not diminished the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities.
Under the old system, the voters faced two at-large elections
with numbered posts every two years. Now they face two
at-large elections with numbered posts every year. The inability to use single-shot voting is identical. The degree of
highlighting of individual races is identical. Minorities are in
the same position every year that they used to be in every
other year. Although there may have been no improvement
in their voting strength, there has been no retrogression,
either.
Cano argues that the increased frequency of elections made
necessary by staggered terms has resulted in retrogression.
The more frequent elections are said to reduce voter turnout, and this has a disproportionate impact on minority voters. In support of this argument, he cites figures from the
April1975 election. That year, when voter turn-out was unusually low, only 5. 7% of the voters were Mexican-Americans. In other years since 1973, the percentage of MexicanAmerican voters has been three to six times as great. These
figures, however, are misleading. In the April 1975 election, both council candidates were running unopposed, and
neither candidate was Mexican-American. This undoubtedly explains both the lower overall turn-out and the lower
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turn-out among Mexican-Americans. For other elections
since 1973, the overall turn-out and the Mexican-American
turn-out were consistently higher than they were before the
new charter, despite the fact that the population increased
only slightly. In 1978, a Mexican-American candidate was
elected in Lockhart for the first time in its history, after five
years of annual elections. The record, therefore, contradicts
Cano's argument. The District Court erred in finding that
the introduction of staggered terms has had a retrogressive
effect on minority voting strength .
IV
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States, we conclude that the election changes introduced by the 1973 Lockhart City Charter will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. The District Court's
findings to the contrary were clearly erroneous. We accordingly vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-802

CITY OF LOCKHART, APPELLANT v. UNITED
STATES AND ALFRED CANO
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
[January - , 1983]

JuSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to consider the application of § 5 of
the Voting Rights Act to the election plan adopted by appellant City of Lockhart in 1973.
I
The City of Lockhart is a community of just under 8,000
people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south of Austin. According to the most recent census figures, almost
47% of the City's population are Mexican-American. As of
1977, however, fewer than 30% of the City's registered voters were Mexican-American.
Before 1973, Lockhart was a "general law" city. Under
Texas law, general-law cities have only those powers that the
State specifically permits them to possess. As authorized by
State law, Lockhart was governed by a commission consisting of a mayor and two commissioners, all serving the same
two-year terms. These offices were filled in April of evennumbered years through at-large elections using a "numbered post" system. Under this system, the two commissioner posts were designated by number, and each candidate
for commissioner specified the post for which he or she
sought election. Thus each race was effectively a separate
election for a separate office. 1
1

This numbered-post system may be contrasted with a system in which
all of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in a single election,
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In 1973, Lockhart adopted a new charter and became a
"home rule" city. In contrast to a general-law city, a homerule city has authority to do whatever is not specifically prohibited by the State. This includes discretion to define the
form of city government and to establish the procedures for
city elections. As part of its new charter, Lockhart chose to
be governed by a city council consisting of a mayor and four
councilmen serving staggered two-year terms. The mayor
and two of the councilmen are elected in April of even-numbered years through at-large elections using the numberedpost system. The other two councilmen are similarly elected
in odd-numbered years.
Under§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, 2 covered jurisdictions may enall of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in a single election,
and the two receiving the greatest number of votes are elected.
2
Section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"[W]henever a State or political subdivision [such as Lockhart] shall enact
or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that
in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(0(2) [42
U. S. C. § 1973b(f)(2) (prohibiting discrimination against members of language minority groups)], and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with
such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief
legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the
Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an
objection within sixty days after such submission. . . .
Neither an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made,
nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment
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force changes in their election laws only after obtaining "preclearance" in one of two ways: (i) they may obtain a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia that the changes do not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a
language minority group, or (ii) they may submit the changes
to the Attorney General, who then has sixty days in which to
object. The Act was extended to the State of Texas in 1975,
covering changes in election procedure from those in effect on
November 1, 1972. See 40 Fed. Reg. 43746 (1975).
In 1977, four Mexican-Americans, including appellee Alfred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of Lockhart's election procedures under the 1973 charter. Cano v. Kirksey,
No. A-77-CA-133 (WD Tex., dismissed Oct. 8, 1982), appeal
pending sub nom. Cano v. Chesser, No. 82-1616 (CA5, filed
Nov. 8, 1982). In the course of that suit, the plaintiffs discovered that Lockhart had never obtained approval under § 5
for the changes instituted in 1973. A second suit then was
brought to enjoin the City from using the new election procedures pending § 5 preclearance. The United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas granted injunctive
relief. 3 Cano v. Chesser, No. A-79-CA-0032 (WD Tex.,
Mar. 2, 1979) (three-judge court).
ment of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure.
. . . Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a
court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of [28 U. S. C.
§ 2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court."
3
In granting the injunction, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
pass on the discriminatory purpose or effect of the changes. All it could do
was determine (i) whether a change was covered by § 5, (ii) if the change
was covered, whether § 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and (iii)
if the requirements were not satisfied, what remedy was appropriate.
See, e. g., United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429
U. S. 642, 641H>47 (1977) (per curiam). Lockhart did not appeal the District Court's finding that the 1973 charter included changes that are cov-
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Once future elections were enjoined pending § 5 approval,
Lockhart sought preclearance. The Attorney General, however, interposed an objection to the election procedures
under the 1973 charter to the extent that they incorporate atlarge elections, the numbered-post system, and staggered
terms for councilmen. Lockhart then filed the present suit
for a declaratory judgment in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Cano intervened as a defendant. As required by § 5, a three-judge court was convened to decide the case.
The District Court, recognizing that the City must prove
both the absence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory
purpose, bifurcated the trial. Addressing only the first
issue, it held, over the dissent of Chief Judge Spottswood
Robinson, of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, that Lockhart's election procedures
have the effect of discriminating against protected minorities. 4 The court first decided that the entire election plan
was subject to § 5's requirements. It then compared Lockhart's current system to that used before the 1973 charter,
except that the court refused to recognize the City's prior use
of numbered posts. This was justified on the ground that
the use of numbered posts was not explicitly authorized by
Texas law, and thus was illegal for a general-law city.. The
court concluded that numbered posts and staggered terms
each have a discriminatory impact, particularly in view of the
history of racial bloc voting in Lockhart.
Chief Judge Robinson, in dissent, agreed with the majority
that Lockhart's city-council election procedures were subject
to § 5 preclearance, and that the use of numbered posts and
staggered terms tended to curb the ability of minorities to
elect minority candidates. But relying on Beer v. United
ered by §5.
4
In view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it was unnecessary for
the District Court to reach the issue of discriminatory purpose.
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States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), he concluded that there was no
retrogression in minority voting strength.
The City appealed the judgment to this Court, contending
that the District Court misconstrued the scope of § 5, and
that, in any event, there has been no retrogression in minority voting strength. The United States, which defended the
suit below, now agrees with Lockhart that the changes have
no retrogressive effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Americans. Cano continues to defend the result below. We
noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1982).
II
We consider first the scope of§ 5's coverage in the circumstances of this case. Lockhart concedes that § 5 applies to its
electoral changes, and that the addition of two seats to its
governing body and the introduction of staggered terms are
covered changes. It contends, however, that § 5 does not
apply to the "continuation" of the two old seats and the continued use of numbered posts. We conclude that there has
been a change with respect to all of the council seats and to
the use of numbered places.
In moving from a three-member commission to a five-member council, Lockhart has changed the nature of the seats at
issue. Council posts one and two are not identical to the old
commission posts one and two. For example, they now constitute only 40% of the council, rather than 67% of the commission. Moreover, one cannot view these seats in isolation,
for they are an integral part of the council. The possible discriminatory purpose or effect of the new seats, admittedly
subject to § 5, cannot be determined in isolation from the
"preexisting" elements of the council. Similarly, the numbered-post system is an integral part of the new election
plan. The impact of any of the seats cannot be evaluated
without considering the fact that they are all filled in elections using numbered posts. 5 We therefore hold that the en5

Lockhart seeks to rely on Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976),
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tire system introduced in the 1973 charter is subject to
preclearance.

III
Having decided that Lockhart's entire 1973 election plan is
subject to § 5, we now determine whether the plan's changes
that have not been precleared by the Attorney General have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race, color, or membership in a language minority group.
A

The first step is to identify the appropriate comparison.
The District Court compared the new plan to what the old
practice would have been without numbered posts. It justified this comparison on the ground that a general-law city
such as Lockhart was not entitled under Texas law to use a
numbered-post system. The court, distinguishing Perkins
v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), reasoned that recognition
of the actual practice rather than the legal requirement
would reward the City for its past illegality. It preferred instead to draw its comparison in a way that would maximize
the reach of § 5.
Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 6 but that is
ess~ntially irrelevant.
The proper comparison is between
but that decision is readily distinguishable on this point. In Beer, we considered the reapportionment of the New Orleans councilmanic districts.
The New Orleans City Council was composed of seven members, two
elected at-large and five elected from districts. New Orleans had reapportioned these districts through a city ordinance. "The ordinance ... made
no reference to the at-large councilmanic seats. Indeed, since those seats
had been established ... by the city charter, an ordinance could not have
altered them; any change in the charter would have required approval by
the city's voters." Id., at 138-139. Furthermore, the ordinance did not
affect the at-large councilmen in any other way. It did not change their
titles. It did not increase or decrease the size of the city council. In
short, the ordinance affected only the district councilmen. It was only in
these circumstances that "[t]he at-large seats ... were not subject to review ... under§ 5." !d., at 139.
6
There does not appear to be any Texas case law on the subject. Lock-
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the new system and the system actually in effect on November 1, 1972, 7 regardless of what state law might have required. This basis of comparison was established in Perkins
v. Matthews, supra. There a city conducted the relevant
election for aldermen by wards, despite a state statute requiring at-large elections. As the Perkins Court explained:
"In our view, § 5's reference to the procedure 'in force or
effect on November 1, 19[72],' must be taken to mean the
procedure that would have been followed if the election
had been held on that date." 400 U. S., at 394.
This conclusion was based on the plain reading of the section's language. It is, moreover, in accord with the Act's underlying policy. Section 5 was intended to halt actual retrogression in minority voting strength without regard for the
legality under state law of the practices already in effect. 8
B

We now consider whether the aspects of the new system to
which the Attorney General objected, when compared to the
practices in use in Lockhart prior to the new charter, have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote guaranteed by § 5. Our inquiry is guided by the principles of Beer
v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). 9
hart had used its numbered-post system for over fifty years without challenge, suggesting a presumption of legality under state law.
7
Since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we consider the
system that would have been in effect if there had been an election then.
That, presumably, is the system that was used without exception between
1917 and 1973. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 394-395 (1971).
8
We also believe that the Attorney General and the District Court for
the District of Columbia should be free to decide preclearance questions on
the essentially factual issues of discriminatory purpose and effect. We
doubt that Congress intended to force either into speculation as to state
law.
9
Cano argues on appeal that Congress altered the Beer standard with
the recent amendment to § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 437, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, see Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,
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Beer involved the reapportionment of the New Orleans
councilmanic districts. Prior to the reapportionment, black
citizens had a majority of the population in only one of the
five districts and a majority of the registered voters in none.
Under the new plan, blacks had a population majority in two
districts and a voter majority in one. Although the new plan
may have remained discriminatory, it nevertheless was not a
regressive change. The Court explained that "[t]he language of § 5 clearly provides that it applies only to proposed
changes in voting procedures." 425 U. S., at 138. "[T]he
purpose of§ 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their
effective exercise of the electoral franchise." I d., at 141.
Since the new plan did not increase the degree of discrimination against blacks, it was entitled to § 5 preclearance.
We apply these principles to the two aspects of the new
system that remain at issue in this case: the numbered-post
system and staggered terms for councilmen. 10 It is recognized that a numbered-post system, in some circumstances,
may have the effect of discriminating against minorities in a
city where racial bloc voting predominates. Use of numbered posts may frustrate the use of "single-shot voting," a
technique that permits concentrating support behind a single
candidate. Lockhart has used numbered posts, however,
consistently since 1917. Effective single-shot voting may be
impossible now, but it was equally impossible under the old
system. The new system may highlight individual races, but
so did the old. As Chief Judge Robinson concluded, "the
voting strength of Lockhart's minorities, whether or not enPub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982). The District Court did not pass on
this argument, and we decline to review it.
10
The Attorney General also objected to the use of at-large elections, but
the District Court did not hold, and the parties before us do not argue, that
the continued existence of at-large elections has a retrogressive effect.
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hanced, [has not been] diminished one whit." App. to Juris.
Statement 33a. The District Court erred in finding that the
continued use of numbered posts has a retrogressive effect on
minority voting strength.
The use of staggered terms also may have a discriminatory
effect under some circumstances, since it, too, might reduce
the opportunity for single-shot voting or tend to highlight individual races. But the introduction of staggered terms has
not diminished the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities.
Under the old system, the voters faced two at-large elections
with numbered posts every two years. Now they face two
at-large elections with numbered posts every year. The inability to use single-shot voting is identical. The degree of
highlighting of individual races is identical. Minorities are in
the same position every year that they used to be in every
other year. Although there may have been no improvement
in their voting strength, there has been no retrogression,
either.
Cano argues that the increased frequency of elections made
necessary by staggered terms has resulted in retrogression.
The more frequent elections are said to reduce voter turnout, and this has a disproportionate impact on minority voters. In support of this argument, he cites figures from the
April1975 election. That year, when voter turn-out was unusually low, only 5. 7% of the voters were Mexican-Americans. In other years since 1973, the percentage of MexicanAmerican voters has been three to six times as great. These
figures, however, are misleading. In the April 1975 election, both council candidates were running unopposed, and
neither candidate was Mexican-American. This undoubtedly explains both the lower overall turn-out and the lower
turn-out among Mexican-Americans. For other elections
since 1973, the overall turn-out and the Mexican-American
turn-out were consistently higher than they were before the
new charter, despite the fact that the population increased
only slightly. In 1978, a Mexican-American candidate was
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elected in Lockhart for the first time in its history, after five
years of annual elections. The record, therefore, contradicts
Cano's argument. The District Court erred in finding that
the introduction of staggered terms has had a retrogressive
effect on minority voting strength.

IV
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States, we conclude that the election changes introduced by the 1973 Lockhart City Charter will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. The District Court's
findings to the contrary were clearly erroneous. We accordingly vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

JUSTICE WHITE dissents.

\
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I join Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, but I dissent
from Parts III and IV. My review of the record convinces
me that the three-judge District Court's factual finding that
the electoral changes introduced in 1973 had a retrogressive
effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Americans in the city
of Lockhart is not clearly erroneous. I therefore would affirm the judgment of the District Court. At the very least, I
would remand the case to that court for it to determine
whether the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub.
L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, have altered the applicable standard
under §5.

5

mfs 02/14/83
To:

JUSTICE POWELL

From:

Michael

Re:
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After some editing that does not alter the meaning {for
present purposes), §5 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Whenever Lockhart enacts a voting procedure different
from that used in 1972, it may institute an action in
DC for a declaratory judgment that such procedure does
not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race, color, or membership in a language minority
group.
Until the court enters such a judgment, no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to
comply with the procedure:
Provided, That the procedure may be enforced without such a proceeding if it
has been precleared by the Attorney General.
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CITY OF LOCKHART, APPELLANT v. UNITED
STATES AND ALFRED CANO
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[February - , 1983]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to consider the application of § 5 of
the Voting Rights Act to the election plan adopted by appellant City of Lockhart in 1973.
I
The City of Lockhart is a community of just under 8,000
people in Caldwell County, Texas, thirty miles south of Austin. According to the most recent census figures, almost
47% of the City's population are Mexican-American. As of
1977, however, fewer than 30% of the City's registered voters were Mexican-American.
Before 1973, Lockhart was a "general law" city. Under
Texas law, general-law cities have only those powers that the
State specifically permits them to possess. As authorized by
State law, Lockhart was governed by a commission consisting of a mayor and two commissioners, all serving the same
two-year terms. These offices were filled in April of evennumbered years through at-large elections using a "numbered post" system. Under this system, the two commissioner posts were designated by number, and each candidate
for commissioner specified the post for which he or she
sought election. Thus each race was effectively a separate
election for a separate office. 1
'This numbered-post system may be contrasted with a system in which
all of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in a single election,
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In 1973, Lockhart adopted a new charter and became a
"home rule" city. In contrast to a general-law city, a homerule city has authority to do whatever is not specifically prohibited by the State. This includes discretion to define the
form of city government and to establish the procedures for
city elections. As part of its new charter, Lockhart chose to
be governed by a city council consisting of a mayor and four
councilmen serving staggered two-year terms. The mayor
and two of the councilmen are elected in April of even-numbered years through at-large elections using the numberedpost system. The other two councilmen are similarly elected
in odd-numbered years.
Under§ 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 439, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c, 2 covered jurisdictions may enall of the candidates for the two commissioner posts run in a single election,
and the two receiving the greatest number of votes are elected.
2
Section 5 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"[W]henever a State or political subdivision [such as Lockhart] shall enact
or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that
in force or effect on November 1, 1972, such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2) [42
U. S. C. § 1973b(f)(2) (prohibiting discrimination against members of language minority groups)], and unless and until the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to comply with
such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure: Provided, That such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure may be enforced without such proceeding if the qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure has been submitted by the chief
legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or subdivision to the
Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an
objection within sixty days after such submission. . . .
Neither an affirmative indication by the Attorney General that no objection will be made,
nor the Attorney General's failure to object, nor a declaratory judgment
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force changes in their election laws only after obtaining "preclearance" in one of two ways: (i) they may obtain a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia that the changes do not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a
language minority group, or (ii) they may submit the changes
to the Attorney General, who then has sixty days in which to
object. The Act was extended to the State of Texas in 1975,
covering changes in election procedure from those in effect on
November 1, 1972. See 40 Fed. Reg. 43746 (1975).
In 1977, four Mexican-Americans, including appellee Alfred Cano, challenged the constitutionality of Lockhart's election procedures under the 1973 charter. Cano v. Kirksey,
No. A-77-CA-133 (WD Tex., dismissed Oct. 8, 1982), appeal
pending sub nom. Cano v. Chesser, No. 82-1616 (CA5, filed
Nov. 8, 1982). In the course of that suit, the plaintiffs discovered that Lockhart had never obtained approval under § 5
for the changes instituted in 1973. A second suit then was
brought to enjoin the City from using the new election procedures pending § 5 preclearance. The United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas granted injunctive
relief.3 Cano v. Chesser, No. A-79-CA-0032 (WD Tex.,
Mar. 2, 1979) (three-judge court).
ment of such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure.
. . . Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a
court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of [28 U. S. C.
§ 2284] and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court."
3
In granting the injunction, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
pass on the discriminatory purpose or effect of the changes. All it could do
was determine (i) whether a change was covered by § 5, (ii) if the change
was covered, whether § 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and (iii)
if the requirements were not satisfied, what remedy was appropriate.
See, e. g., United States v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 429
U. S. 642, 645--647 (1977) (per curiam). Lockhart did not appeal the District Court's finding that the 1973 charter included changes that are cov-
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Once future elections were enjoined pending § 5 approval,
Lockhart sought preclearance. The Attorney General, however, interposed an objection to the election procedures
under the 1973 charter to the extent that they incorporate atlarge elections, the numbered-post system, and staggered
terms for councilmen. Lockhart then filed the present suit
for a declaratory judgment in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. Cano intervened as a defendant. As required by § 5, a three-judge court was convened to decide the case.
The District Court, recognizing that the City must prove
both the absence of discriminatory effect and discriminatory
purpose, bifurcated the trial. Addressing only the first
issue, it held, over the dissent of Chief Judge Spottswood
Robinson, of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, that Lockhart's election procedures
have the effect of discriminating against protected minorities. 4 The court first decided that the entire election plan
was subject to § 5's requirements. It then compared Lockhart's current system to that used before the 1973 charter,
except that the court refused to recognize the City's prior use
of numbered posts. This was justified on the ground that
the use of numbered posts was not explicitly authorized by
Texas law, and thus was illegal for a general-law city. The
court concluded that numbered posts and staggered terms
each have a discriminatory impact, particularly in view of the
history of racial bloc voting in Lockhart.
Chief Judge Robinson, in dissent, agreed with the majority
that Lockhart's city-council election procedures were subject
to § 5 preclearance, and that the use of numbered posts and
staggered terms tended to curb the ability of minorities to
elect minority candidates. But relying on Beer v. United
ered by §5.
' In view of its decision on discriminatory effect, it was unnecessary for
the District Court to reach the issue of discriminatory purpose.
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States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976), he concluded that there was no
retrogression in minority voting strength.
The City appealed the judgment to this Court, contending
that the District Court misconstrued the scope of § 5, and
that, in any event, there has been no retrogression in minority voting strength. The United States, which defended the
suit below, now agrees with Lockhart that the changes have
no retrogressive effect on the voting rights of Mexican-Americans. Cano continues to defend the result below. We
noted probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1982).
II

We consider first the scope of§ 5's coverage in the circumstances of this case. Lockhart concedes that § 5 applies to its
electoral changes, and that the addition of two seats to its
governing body and the introduction of staggered terms are
covered changes. It contends, however, that § 5 does not
apply to the "continuation" of the two old seats and the continued use of numbered posts. We conclude that there has
been a change with respect to all of the council seats and to
the use of numbered places.
In moving from a three-member commission to a five-member council, Lockhart has changed the nature of the seats at
issue. Council posts one and two are not identical to the old
commission posts one and two. For example, they now constitute only 40% of the council, rather than 67% of the commission. Moreover, one cannot view these seats in isolation,
for they are an integral part of the council. The possible discriminatory purpose or effect of the new seats, admittedly
subject to § 5, cannot be determined in isolation from the
"preexisting" elements of the council. Similarly, the numbered-post system is an integral part of the new election
plan. The impact of any of the seats cannot be evaluated
without considering the fact that they are all filled in elections using numbered posts. 5 We therefore hold that the en5

Lockhart seeks to rely on Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976),
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tire system introduced in the 1973 charter is subject to
preclearance.

III
Having decided that Lockhart's entire 1973 election plan is
subject to § 5, we now determine whether the plan's changes
that have not been precleared by the Attorney General have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race, color, or membership in a language minority group.
A

The first step is to identify the appropriate comparison.
The District Court compared the new plan to what the old
practice would have been without numbered posts. It justified this comparison on the ground that a general-law city
such as Lockhart was not entitled under Texas law to use a
numbered-post system. The court, distinguishing Perkins
v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379 (1971), reasoned that recognition
of the actual practice rather than the legal requirement
would reward the City for its past illegality. It preferred instead to draw its comparison in a way that would maximize
the reach of § 5.
Texas law is not entirely clear on this point, 6 but that is
essentially irrelevant. The proper comparison is between
but that decision is readily distinguishable on this point. In Beer, we considered the reapportionment of the New Orleans councilmanic districts.
The New Orleans City Council was composed of seven members, two
elected at-large and five elected from districts. New Orleans had reapportioned these districts through a city ordinance. "The ordinance ... made
no reference to the at-large councilmanic seats. Indeed, since those seats
had been established ... by the city charter, an ordinance could not have
altered them; any change in the charter would have required approval by
the city's voters." Id., at 138-139. Furthermore, the ordinance did not
affect the at-large councilmen in any other way. It did not change their
titles. It did not increase or decrease the size of the city council. In
short, the ordinance affected only the district councilmen. It was only in
these circumstances that "[t]he at-large seats ... were not subject to review ... under§ 5." Id., at 139.
6
There does not appear to be any Texas case law on the subject. Lock-

t
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the new system and the system actually in effect on N ovember 1, 1972, 7 regardless of what state law might have required. This basis of comparison was established in Perkins
v. Matthews, supra. There a city conducted the relevant
election for aldermen by wards, despite a state statute requiring at-large elections. As the Perkins Court explained:
"In our view, § 5's reference to the procedure 'in force or
effect on November 1, 19[72],' must be taken to mean the
procedure that would have been followed if the election
had been held on that date." 400 U. S., at 394.
This conclusion was based on the plain reading of the section's language. It is, moreover, in accord with the Act's underlying policy. Section 5 was intended to halt actual retrogression in minority voting strength without regard for the
legality under state law of the practices already in effect. 8
B
' to
We now consider whether the aspects of the new system
which the Attorney General objected, when compared to the
practices in use in Lockhart prior to the new charter, have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote guaranteed by § 5. Our inquiry is guided by the principles of Beer
v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). 9
hart had used its numbered-post system for over fifty years without challenge, suggesting a presumption of legality under state law.
7
Since no election was held on November 1, 1972, we consider the
system that would have been in effect if there had been an election then.
That, presumably, is the system that was used without exception between
1917 and 1973. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U. S. 379, 394-395 (1971).
8
We also believe that the Attorney General and the District Court for
the District of Columbia should be free to decide preclearance questions on
the essentially factual issues of discriminatory purpose and effect. We
doubt that Congress intended to force either into speculation as to state
law.
9
Cano argues on appeal that Congress altered the Beer standard with
the recent amendment to § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 437, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1973, see Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,
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Beer involved the reapportionment of the New Orleans
councilmanic districts. Prior to the reapportionment, black
citizens had a clear majority of the population and a bare majority of the registered voters in one of the five districts. In
a second district, they had just under a majority of the population. Under the new plan, blacks had slightly larger population and voter majorities in the first district, and a bare majority of the population in the second. Although the new
plan may have remained discriminatory, it nevertheless was
not a regressive change. The Court explained that "[t]he
language of § 5 clearly provides that it applies only to proposed changes in voting procedures." 425 U. S., at 138.
"[T]he purpose of § 5 has always been to insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect
to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." I d., at
141. 10 Since the new plan did not increase the degree of discrimination against blacks, it }Vas entitled to § 5 preclearance.
Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982). The District Court did not pass on
this argument, and we decline to review it in the first instance. The issue
remains open on remand.
1
°Contrary to the suggestion in JUSTICE MARSHALL'S dissent, post, at
7-8, the Beer Court did not distinguish between ameliorative changes and
changes that simply preserved current minority voting strength. The
Court explained that the purpose of § 5 was to prohibit only retrogressive
changes. 425 U. S., at 141. It then applied this standard to the New Orleans reapportionment, agreeing that an ameliorative change was a fortiori
permissible. Ibid. The only suggestion in the several Beer opinions that
there might be a distinction between ameliorative and non-ameliorative
changes was not in the Court's opinion; rather it was in JUSTICE MARSHALL'S dissent, id., at 150, n. 6, and he explained why the distinction is
"unrealistic," ibid. Cf. id., at 143 (WHITE, J., dissenting) ("I cannot agree
[with the Court] that§ 5 ... reaches only those changes in election procedures that are more burdensome to the complaining minority than pre-existing procedures."); see also City of Richmond v. United States , 422 U. S.
358, 388 (1975) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) ("[T]he fundamental objective of
§ 5 [is] the protection of present levels of voting effectiveness for the black
population.") (emphasis in original). JUSTICE MARSHALL'S current dis-

J
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We apply these principles to the two aspects of the new
system that remain at issue in this case: the numbered-post
system and staggered terms for councilmen. u It is recognized that a numbered-post system, in some circumstances,
may have the effect of discriminating against minorities in a
city where racial bloc voting predominates. Use of numbered posts may frustrate the use of "single-shot voting," a
technique that permits concentrating support behind a single
candidate. Lockhart has used numbered posts, however,
consistently since 1917. Effective single-shot voting may be
impossible now, but it was equally impossible under the old
system. The new system may highlight individual races, but
so did the old. As Chief Judge Robinson concluded, "the
voting strength of Lockhart's minorities, whether or not enhanced, [has not been] diminished one whit." App. to Juris.
Statement 33a. The District Court erred in finding that the
continued use of numbered posts has a retrogressive effect on
minority voting strength.
The use of staggered terms also may have a discriminatory
effect under some circumstances, since it, too, might reduce
the opportunity for single-shot voting or tend to highlight individual races. But the introduction of staggered terms has
not diminished the voting strength of Lockhart's minorities.
Under the old system, the voters faced two at-large elections
with numbered posts every two years. Now they face two
at-large elections with numbered posts every year. The inability to use single-shot voting is identical. The degree of
highlighting of individual races is identical. Minorities are in
the same position every year that they used to be in every
other year. Although there may have been no improvement
senting opinion essentially reiterates the position stated forcefully in his
Beer dissent-a position rejected by a majority of the Court at that time.
11
The Attorney General also objected to the use of at-large elections, but
the District Court did not hold, and the parties before us do not argue, that
the continued existence of at-large elections has a retrogressive effect.

I
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in their voting strength, there has been no retrogression,
either.
Cano argues that the increased frequency of elections made
necessary by staggered terms has resulted in retrogression.
The more frequent elections are said to reduce voter turnout, and this has a disproportionate impact on minority voters. In support of this argument, he cites figures from the
April1975 election. That year, when voter turn-out was unusually low, only 5. 7% of the voters were Mexican-Americans. In other years since 1973, the percentage of MexicanAmerican voters has been three to six times as great. These
figures, however, are misleading. In the April 1975 election, both council candidates were running unopposed, and
neither candidate was Mexican-American. This undoubtedly explains both the lower overall turn-out and the lower
turn-out among Mexican-Americans. For other elections
since 1973, the overall turn-out and the Mexican-American
turn-out were consistently higher than they were before the
new charter, despite the fact that the population increased
only slightly. In 1978, a Mexican-American candidate was
elected in Lockhart for the first time in its history, after five
years of annual elections. The record, therefore, contradicts
Cano's argument. The District Court erred in finding that
the introduction of staggered terms has had a retrogressive
effect on minority voting strength.
IV
Applying the standards of Beer v. United States, we conclude that the election changes introduced by the 1973 Lockhart City Charter will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. The District Court's
findings to the contrary were clearly erroneous. We accordingly vacate the District Court's judgment, and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.
JUSTICE WHITE dissents.
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Tl'ri-e.....is a case a£ J.Slft~ I:Hulerl\ the Voting Rights Act
~~ lA-/ k.c ~
tbat . ~ t~ ~ from the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia.
Appellant, a small community in Texas, changed its
form of government in 1973.

The new charter provided for a

mayor and four councilmen, replacing a maJ or and two commissioners.

·~

After proceedings not now relevant, j the District
,1\

Court held that the new charter was subject to §5 of the

-- concluded

Act,~and

that its provisions for numbered posts/

and staggered terms;had a discriminatory

~~n

protected

minorities.
The District Court did not consider whether the
plan also had a discriminatory purpose.
~

We agree that §5 required preclearance of the entire plan.
effect.

We do not agree that it had a discriminatory

1

~$_,.

•

2.

We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals
and remand for further proceedings.
Justice Rehnquist has filed a dissenting opinion
in which the Chief Justice has joined.
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